Yirsandy Rodríguez

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images It has been a long time since Craig Kimbrel stopped being one of the best closers in Major League Baseball. He is 38 years old, has 17 seasons of experience, and has been on five different teams over the past two campaigns. He made his debut with the Kansas City Royals on August 12 and did not allow earned runs in his first nine relief appearances. That stretch includes an unearned run that resulted in the Royals’ 4-3 loss last Saturday. On Monday, Kimbrel allowed five runs in the 10th inning against the Arizona Diamondbacks and lost again. He is pitching to a 4.53 ERA and has 0.2 fWAR in 43 appearances. It is his highest fWAR since he saved 23 games for the Baltimore Orioles in 2024, and that leaves us with an interesting situation. Without being responsible for closing games, he has still been able to add value as a reliever. So, in large part, it depends on how we look at his season this year. Before allowing the five runs Monday against the D-backs, Kimbrel had a 1.99 ERA over his last 22 appearances. What's notable about his consistency is that he had not allowed a home run against the 89 batters he had faced; if we add Monday’s game to that stretch, Kimbrel’s homerless streak extended to 98 batters faced, although his ERA rose to 3.42. Often, a single bad relief appearance can change the look of a dominant reliever. In Kimbrel’s case, the reality is that for much of this season, his outings have felt as if he still has a little fuel left in the tank. Now, between injuries and inconsistencies, the question is whether the Royals will take Kimbrel’s experience and improvements into account in their plans for 2027. So far, they have brought him into important situations—with the game tied or in a save opportunity—in seven of his first 10 relief appearances. We already know Kimbrel has struggled in his last two appearances, but throughout the season, he has been more consistent under pressure and with little rest. When he has pitched with the game tied or protecting a lead in save situations, Kimbrel has allowed a .727 OPS with a 2.95 K/BB ratio, one strikeout better than his overall 1.95 mark this season. He has combined that resurgence with a great ability to recover. In consecutive relief appearances or with one day of rest, Kimbrel has produced his best performance, holding opponents to a .206/.309/.353 slash line, with a .662 OPS allowed in 13 appearances. That said, there is one point we cannot overlook here, and that is that Kimbrel was more vulnerable in his matchups against left-handed hitters. In 29 of his 43 relief appearances, he has faced four or fewer batters, and he has been used for more than one inning only once all year. Although he has had a slight improvement in his velocity (93.4 to 93.7 mph) compared with the small sample from last season, hitters are still finding ways to crush his four-seam fastball. Pitch Type Split Pitch % PA HR K% xSLG Whiff% Dist (ft) Hard Hit% Four Seamer vs LHB 30.5% 158 9 28.5% .410 27.2% 196 37.5% Four Seamer vs RHB 27.6% 136 2 27.2% .384 25.3% 210 47.4% Knuckle Curve vs LHB 10.6% 37 0 16.2% .374 22.7% 108 41.4% Knuckle Curve vs RHB 7.4% 24 0 25.0% .366 35.2% 132 35.3% Sweeper vs LHB 2.2% 11 0 27.3% .339 21.1% 121 16.7% Sweeper vs RHB 5.6% 31 0 38.7% .356 42.9% 176 44.4% Changeup vs LHB 1.5% 6 0 33.3% .090 50.0% 90 0.0% Sinker vs LHB 0.4% 2 0 0.0% - 0.0% 275 0.0% Sinker vs RHB 2.3% 9 0 11.1% .262 13.6% 117 16.7% This summary corresponds to the combined 2023, 2024, and 2026 seasons, when he experienced more wear and faced at least 180 opponents; I did not include 2025 because Kimbrel pitched only 12 innings. There you can see it: all 11 home runs allowed by Kimbrel have come against his four-seam fastball, nine of them against left-handed hitters. Right-handed hitters have connected for only two, but they have a higher Hard Hit% rate and the average distance is 210 feet. The knuckle curve, his primary secondary pitch, has also not been able to dominate left-handed hitters enough. Let’s look at a chart of the slugging percentage allowed by Kimbrel in the combined 2023, 2024, and 2026 seasons when he threw his four-seam fastball against left- and right-handed hitters. The impact of left-handed hitters appears in the chart on the left, and right-handed hitters on the right. What is most concerning about Kimbrel’s fastball is that it can barely survive where it used to, on the edges of the zone. But there is also another obvious problem, and that is that hitters from both sides are also managing to make quality contact outside the strike zone. So, if the Royals bet on Kimbrel helping them in some role, they have to keep in mind that left-handed hitters will continue to be a problem. That could give us part of the expectations the Royals might have for his profile going forward. At 38 years old and with a career that could end up with him in Cooperstown, Kimbrel still does not want to give up, and he has shown signs that he still has something to offer the worst bullpen in baseball. View full article

Image courtesy of Kiyoshi Mio-Imagn Images It's hard to find a worse decline than Seth Lugo’s since July: in 17 starts, he has the highest ERA (6.24) among qualified starters, the third-worst xFIP (4.78), and the second-lowest LOB% (61.1). That is only a summarized part of the problem. The worst part is that Lugo has become increasingly predictable. His strikeout rate has fallen to 6.3 K/9 — the second-worst mark in the ranking — and his pitches are generating the lowest chase rate from opposing hitters when he throws them outside the strike zone. The problem is not hidden in the repertoire of the 36-year-old veteran right-hander. Lugo’s fastball and breaking ball have fallen from the 96th percentile in 2024 to the 11th and 1st percentiles, respectively. Most of the metrics, such as Chase%, Whiff%, xBA and xSLG, have fallen to career-worst percentiles for Lugo and are also among the worst marks in the major leagues. The decline in impact has been terrible, but there is no bigger problem here than the way hitters are crushing Lugo’s four-seam fastball. In 86 plate appearances, they are hitting .416 with a .701 slugging percentage. The result becomes much more concerning when we see that this is not a complete decline. When comparing some of Lugo’s metrics with last season, when he limited hitters to a .238 BA and .495 SLG against his four-seam fastball, there are some surprising differences: he has a higher Whiff Rate (15.7% vs. 14.6%), he is generating a lower Perfect Contact rate (26% vs. 38%), and his average velocity remains at 91.7 mph. There is also no drastic change in his IVB (15.2”), although it is below his own level from previous years and 0.4 inches below average. In fact, the Horizontal Break (8.8”) is the major change in 2026: +1.4” from 2025 and +2.1” from 2024. If we had not seen the results of those 86 plate appearances, much of this analysis would lead us to think that Lugo’s four-seamer is not failing because it has lost everything that once made it work. In a way, part of the reality is the opposite. At 91.7 mph, Lugo has less velocity and less ride than he did in 2022–23, but he is now generating more horizontal movement. That said, what might have indicated some improvement has resulted in the exact opposite. We usually look for trends that help us understand what is happening in each pitcher-batter matchup and, in the case of pitchers, how they are trying to attack and how their weapons are being answered. Lugo’s case is largely the result of many fastballs that failed to put him in control of the at-bat. It has not been as deficient within the matchup as the final results make it appear. This chart allows us to answer most of our questions about his fastball. Literally, opponents are getting to it throughout the strike zone, which has led Lugo to reduce its usage by nearly 4.0% from June to now. The chart on the left shows all at-bats, while the middle one shows matchups against left-handed hitters and the next one against right-handed hitters. As you can see, left-handed hitters have been unstoppable in the strike zone, especially when they hit pitches from the middle of the zone and above. Right-handed hitters have been more limited, but they have produced good results when they connect with pitches high in the middle of the zone and outside the strike zone. From June to now, no qualified pitcher with at least 200 four-seam fastballs thrown has allowed more damage than Lugo. Name Pitches AVG OBP SLG OPS ISO BABIP wOBA wRC+ Seth Lugo 227 .429 .489 .833 1.323 .405 .516 .550 272 Jack Perkins 359 .329 .455 .772 1.227 .443 .327 .503 238 Carson Whisenhunt 215 .436 .556 .641 1.197 .205 .471 .504 232 Kyle Finnegan 276 .400 .463 .686 1.148 .286 .434 .486 225 Zack Littell 245 .321 .397 .786 1.183 .464 .278 .491 223 Luis Medina 208 .413 .517 .609 1.126 .196 .581 .482 222 Zac Gallen 212 .400 .433 .709 1.142 .309 .367 .481 216 Spencer Arrighetti 277 .346 .379 .769 1.149 .423 .324 .471 215 Merrill Kelly 431 .321 .433 .718 1.151 .397 .254 .475 212 Jeffrey Springs 509 .340 .446 .660 1.107 .321 .355 .465 212 There are results that seem absurd, such as the .516 BABIP, the remarkable 1.323 OPS allowed, and the 272 wRC+. His opponents’ in-zone contact rate against Lugo during that span is 95.5%, the highest he has allowed in any month or stretch of the first or second half of a season in his entire career. All of the trends you see there continue to rise. Lugo has allowed a .454 BA and an average exit velocity above 93 mph since July. We know this decline in performance is unprecedented, but the decline of his four-seam fastball began last season. Since then, Lugo has thrown 1,662 four-seam fastballs and has never been able to record two consecutive swings and misses against any opponent. Regardless of everything we have analyzed here, that says a lot about what Lugo himself must be feeling and where his confidence stands every time he has to throw a fastball. There is very little time left this season to change this story, so Lugo will have to think about how he is going to make his adjustments while the Royals also explore how much he can contribute to their rotation in the future. View full article

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images Nate Pearson is 30 years old and is in his sixth season in the major leagues. He has pitched for four teams, has an 11-7 record and a 4.66 ERA with -0.2 bWAR in his career — the fWAR has handled his efforts better, placing him at a clean zero. In 2024, the Blue Jays trusted his right arm and gave him enough work to stabilize himself. He never did. He relieved in 41 games and finished with -0.6 bWAR, a 74 ERA+, and a 4.64 FIP. His strikeout rate seemed interesting (11.5 K/9), but he received cruel punishment from the opposition with a 1.8 HR/9 rate. Then, the Cubs tried to fix his inconsistencies. They couldn't either. The 83 ERA+ that Pearson recorded during four seasons in Toronto dropped one more step, finishing at 80. The Houston Astros gave him another opportunity, and his performance improved considerably, but he could not remain part of the plan. That was how Pearson arrived in Kansas City at the end of July, where he found the worst bullpen in the Major Leagues this year. The Royals' relievers have the worst fWAR (-3.2) and the worst xERA (4.86) in all of the Majors, along with the worst xFIP (4.82) in the American League. Even so, for Pearson, the news did not seem so devastating. He had a new job. Since then, his performances have been surprising, to the point of placing himself as one of the team's most consistent relievers. In his first 15 appearances with the Royals since last July 26, Pearson leads the bullpen with a 0.61 ERA, .189 BABIP allowed, a high 93.8 LOB%, and has not allowed home runs against 59 opponents. His 0.2 fWAR is only behind Daniel Lynch IV (0.3). In four of his first five appearances, the Royals used Pearson in games with the score against them. The first time they handed him the ball to relieve in a key situation, he could not do an effective job against the Minnesota Twins on August 6. He inherited runners on first and third after one out, with a one-run lead during the top of the eighth inning. Pearson ended up allowing both runs. In his next appearance, he managed to close out the game in the 6-3 win against the Chicago Cubs. Since then, he has appeared six times in the eighth and four in the ninth, delivering very effective relief appearances. His only failure was on August 15, when he allowed one run in the bottom of the eighth against the Angels, who eventually took the 1-0 victory. From being a reliever in already-lost games, Pearson's consistency has changed how the Royals plan his role. He has recorded four holds, a pair of saves and a 0.51 ERA in his last 18 relief appearances, including his last outings with the Astros. If we go a little farther back, Pearson has allowed only two earned runs or fewer on two occasions during his last 26 outings. The Astros have had one of the strongest bullpens throughout the entire season, so it was difficult to keep a spot for Pearson. However, after his arrival in Kansas City, he has taken advantage of the opportunities, and his adjustments are still underway. The big question here, of course, is how he is doing it. Compared to his arsenal from last year, Pearson has made two key adjustments: first, he brought back the sinker, which we will talk about in a minute. And along with the mix of the fastball and slider, he is also giving the curveball more use. In a smaller proportion, he has brought back the changeup for the first time since 2021, but only in very specific situations against left-handed hitters. That said, there is a really interesting story around his sinker, as it is becoming an important weapon: it has 4.4 inches less vertical movement than his four-seam fastball (16.5" IVB at 97.7 mph). He does not use it as often, nor is it his main swing-and-miss pitch — the four-seamer and slider remain his main options — but hitters have an offensive line of only .067/.222/.067 against the sinker. Year Pitch Avg. Miss Dist. (Inches) Flawed Swing % Perfect Contact % Over Avg. Over Dist. (Inches) Lined Up Under Avg. Under Dist. (Inches) 2025 Curveball -- 20% 0% 40% -3.8 60% 0% -- 2026 Curveball 4.1 16% 16% 42% -4.6 53% 5% 2.3 2026 Changeup 0.2 0% 17% 0% -- 67% 33% 3.0 2023 Four Seamer 0.7 2% 19% 2% -2.2 46% 52% 3.0 2026 Sinker 2.0 0% 19% 11% -3.4 73% 16% 2.8 2023 Curveball -- 0% 20% 0% -- 100% 0% -- 2024 Slider 5.0 13% 20% 29% -4.5 62% 9% 3.0 2026 Slider 3.8 7% 20% 25% -3.9 63% 12% 2.7 2024 Curveball 7.0 16% 23% 32% -6.5 68% 0% -- 2025 Slider 4.6 8% 24% 14% -5.5 68% 18% 2.7 2026 Four Seamer 1.2 3% 24% 1% -4.8 59% 41% 3.2 2023 Slider 5.7 8% 31% 8% -7.7 54% 38% 2.5 2024 Four Seamer 1.2 3% 31% <1% -2.6 60% 39% 3.1 2025 Four Seamer 1.1 3% 40% 3% -2.5 74% 24% 3.0 2024 Sinker 0.1 0% 43% 0% -- 93% 7% 2.0 Look at a determining detail here: hitters have reduced their Perfect Contact% from 50% last year to 19% this season. The most concerning point could be how hitters continue to register a high Lined Up percentage (73%) against the sinker. That point connects quite a bit with the fact that Pearson's sinker whiff rate is the lowest of all his pitches, only 10.5%. However, the average exit velocity is at 82.6 mph, and this has a lot to do with the improvements in the sinker's Vertical Drop, which has reached 16.9. While the sinker begins to take more prominence in his repertoire, the curveball and slider continue to record the highest rates of swings and misses, at a time when Pearson's fastball is above his average velocity this season. Although there is still a lot to see about how all these adjustments evolve, Pearson had never had a month with this much dominance in his entire career. That moment has arrived as he begins to resurface as an interesting piece in the worst bullpen in the majors this season. We will see what comes next. But for now, Pearson is taking advantage of this opportunity. View full article

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images After an explosive start to his second year with the Kansas City Royals, Carter Jensen’s power has been considerably limited over the last two months of the season. Jensen has just one home run in his last 56 plate appearances, and his OPS has plummeted to .508 over that span. After posting a 108 wRC+ and 1.6 fWAR from March/April through June, he has fallen to a 69 wRC+ and 0.1 fWAR since July. Contrary to what happens to hitters when they get trapped in a slump, plate discipline has not been the reason for the collapse. Period BABIP AVG SLG wRC+ GB% FB% LD% HR/FB O-Swing% Z-Swing% Z-Contact% FastSw% Z-Contact% MAR/APR - JUN .306 .251 .446 108 33.3% 48.7% 17.9% 12.6% 25.0% 63.2% 84.5% 38.8% 84.5% JUL - AUG .220 .162 .325 69 33.3% 56.3% 10.4% 9.3% 24.9% 68.5% 84.4% 32.6% 84.4% As you can see, Jensen is not chasing more pitches outside the zone, and he remains the same hitter prone to lifting the ball. He is taking more swings against pitches in the strike zone, and he has increased his contact. The problems come after he makes contact. His HR/FB% rate has fallen by 3.3%, and that loss of impact in his swing has been the most concerning because of what it has meant for the Royals. But he has also lost the rhythm in the production of the rest of his contact. The version of Jensen we saw during the first three months of the season really did not show that he can survive without his power. In fact, during this slump that has affected him since the beginning of July, Jensen has had a 2.0% increase in his BB-K% rate, while his .293 wOBA has dropped to .282. Nothing about his plate discipline is causing the problem here. That said, let’s go back for a moment to September 2025. Jensen was called up to make his debut and posted an exciting .300/.391/.550 offensive line, with three home runs, 13 RBIs and a 159 OPS+ in his first 69 plate appearances. Two of his three home runs came against fastballs. In April, Jensen began hammering the fastball at a phenomenal rate: he averaged a .603 xSLG in 52 plate appearances and hit six home runs on his 30 balls in play. In other words, taking September 2025 and April 2026, he had hit eight home runs in his first 49 balls in play against Major League fastballs. That was something that quickly placed his ability at a higher level for a second-year player. Between March/April and June, 12 of Jensen’s 15 home runs came against fastballs, so the opposition was beginning to have a more serious task ahead. Since July, they have managed to stop him. Carter Jensen vs. Fastballs Period Pitches PA HR HR% xBA xSLG xwOBA BABIP Whiff% Hard Hit% Barrel/BBE% Mar/Apr - Jun 1,212 304 12 3.9% .221 .373 .293 .306 28.9% 43.3% 8.8% Jul - Aug 784 178 5 2.8% .169 .348 .282 .220 30.4% 43.8% 13.5% Jensen’s swing is still hitting the ball hard. His Barrel/BBE rate has improved by 4.7%, his Hard Hit% has not fallen, and there are no major differences in his whiff rate. The inconsistencies in his swing against fastballs begin to appear in his low production when he puts the ball in play. Even the difference in HR% does not seem notable, but the collapse in BABIP has been devastating. Let’s look at the differences against each type of fastball: Period Pitch Type PA HR K% Hard Hit% xSLG BABIP MAR/APR - JUN Sinker 41 2 17.1% 56.7% .489 .536 JUL - AUG Sinker 24 0 29.2% 46.2% .243 .231 Period Pitch Type PA HR K% Hard Hit% xSLG BABIP MAR/APR - JUN Four Seamer 90 4 31.1% 40.8% .352 .267 JUL - AUG Four Seamer 59 3 40.7% 39.1% .324 .150 Period Pitch Type PA HR K% Hard Hit% xSLG BABIP MAR/APR - JUN Cutter 19 3 31.6% 66.7% .701 .444 JUL - AUG Cutter 9 1 33.3% 66.7% .637 .200 As expected, the major drops in BABIP have affected Jensen’s xSLG, and his high strikeout rates add to this. He has not hit another home run against the sinker since he hit the first pitch of the game on June 30 for a 421-ft home run against Rays right-hander Griffin Jax. There is one detail we cannot forget: Jensen had just turned 23 on July 3. This has been his first season as a starter. He has played 123 games and has accumulated 488 plate appearances. This is the first time in his career that he is dealing with the pressure of having to make immediate adjustments. There is no doubt he has the talent to prevail, and he has earned the opportunity with the Royals. He has already shown that his swing can impact high velocity. The opposition has found a way to counter his explosiveness at the plate, and now the challenge for Jensen is to make his contact ability and power resurface. View full article

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images Looking at Jac Caglianone’s stats page on FanGraphs is an absolute delight, even if at some point you lost hope that he had enough talent to make an impact as a hitter in the major leagues. His debut last year with the Kansas City Royals was plagued by inconsistencies and only a few flashes of his potential in the batter’s box. But, for a rookie who was only 22 years old, there will always be some margin for error. Caglianone took advantage of it pretty quickly. Comparing his performance to last year shows two absurdly different versions. 2025: -1.6 fWAR, 46 wRC+, 7.8 BB%, 22.4 K%, .172 BABIP, 7 HR, 18 RBI, 232 PA 2026: 2.2 fWAR, 124 wRC+, 6.2 BB%, 25.8 K%, .336 BABIP, 22 HR, 60 RBI, 465 PA The first big difference between the two samples is plate appearances, as Caglianone has doubled last year’s sample. That starting point is much more impactful when we analyze the offensive breakout across all the major offensive patterns. Obviously, the differences in the power samples quickly grab your attention. But the categories that stand out to me the most are BABIP and the production shown by the jump in wRC+. However, the key point here goes far beyond the peripheral statistics. It all starts with his approach at the plate. Season Monthly O-Swing% Z-Swing% Swing% O-Contact% Z-Contact% Contact% F-Strike% SwStr% 2025 2025 38.5% 67.5% 51.3% 57.8% 87.5% 75.0% 62.5% 12.9% 2026 1st Half 35.5% 70.0% 51.7% 52.2% 82.5% 71.4% 62.8% 14.8% 2026 2nd Half 47.3% 77.6% 61.5% 62.5% 90.6% 79.2% 72.4% 12.8% Difference 11.8% 7.6% 9.8% 10.3% 8.1% 7.8% 9.6% -2.0% Caglianone is being more aggressive against pitches inside and outside the strike zone, and the results have been revealing: that extreme aggressiveness is accompanied by much more contact in this second half of the season. As you can see, his swing rate in the zone had already increased in the first half of this season compared to his 2025 metrics. The difference was contact, with a similar loss both inside and outside the zone. What comes next is even more absurd, as Caglianone has solved that reduction in contact with much more aggressiveness instead of trying to be more selective. This, obviously, is the starting point for getting to the best part of the adjustment. As you would expect, a more expansive swing is going to put many more balls in play. But, at the same time, aggressive hitters also end up reducing a large part of their quality of contact. On the other hand, what could tip the balance is if that additional contact can turn into production. Caglianone is achieving something that does not usually come with such marked aggressiveness: he is taking more swings, putting more balls in play, and turning that contact into production. His power when he gets to pull is evident, but what makes the adjustment even more interesting is that he is also producing when the ball ends up toward the opposite field. Season LD% GB% FB% HR/FB Pull% Cent% Oppo% Soft% Med% Hard% 2025 15.8% 50.0% 34.2% 13.0% 43.0% 37.3% 19.6% 21.5% 41.1% 37.3% 2026 22.8% 46.3% 30.9% 22.9% 46.9% 35.4% 17.7% 11.6% 45.7% 42.8% Differences 7.0% -3.7% -3.3% 9.9% 3.9% -1.9% -1.9% -9.9% 4.6% 5.5% Here you can see how two key points connect: his high aggressiveness in looking for pitches anywhere in the zone and how he has found a way to pull the ball more often. What he is achieving is lethal: a 7.0-percentage-point increase in line drives, a result that brings balance, especially by eliminating a portion of ground balls and fly balls. More hard hits, and a 9.9-percentage-point reduction in Soft%. There are only six qualified hitters with at least a 50% HR/FB rate and .300+ BABIP. Caglianone is in the elite! Name Team HR/FB BABIP GB/FB LD% GB% FB% IFFB% Drake Baldwin ATL 56.3% .351 4.00 24.5% 60.4% 15.1% 0.0% Jake Bauers MIL 56.0% .305 2.84 19.3% 59.7% 21.0% 0.0% Yordan Alvarez HOU 52.5% .450 1.60 30.7% 42.7% 26.7% 2.5% Willson Contreras BOS 51.2% .383 1.65 24.0% 47.3% 28.7% 4.7% Ryan O'Hearn PIT 50.0% .343 3.00 30.4% 52.2% 17.4% 5.0% Jac Caglianone KCR 50.0% .333 3.07 21.9% 58.9% 19.2% 10.7% Elite hitters such as Ben Rice, Luis García Jr. and Hunter Goodman have been left out because their respective BABIPs remained below .282. Well, Caglianone’s impact does not end here. Let’s now look at another of his potential highlights this year, and that is his production when he hits toward the opposite side of the field. I limited the filter to left-handed hitters with at least 50 plate appearances this year: Name Team PA wRC+ ISO BABIP AVG OBP SLG wOBA Garrett Mitchell MIL 63 270 .258 .525 .532 .532 .790 .570 Christian Yelich MIL 67 242 .313 .438 .463 .463 .776 .530 James Wood WSN 91 237 .396 .354 .418 .418 .813 .523 Tyler Soderstrom ATH 65 236 .415 .361 .400 .400 .815 .513 Jac Caglianone KCR 55 211 .236 .415 .436 .436 .673 .478 Caglianone is here again! And he is doing it in the Top 5 in wRC+ among the left-handed hitters in this group (211), along with other impressive numbers. Yes, I think you’ve already noticed that he is the only left-handed hitter who appears in both profiles: devastating power when pulling, and elite production when he manages to hit toward the opposite field. I’d like to know what you think, but personally, I love hitters who can combine this approach. I understand that power hitters should always be prepared to pull, but the fact that they can often make adjustments and find success toward the opposite side is another level. Caglianone is showing it in many ways. And he is doing it against all types of pitchers. Split Pitch % PA HR xSLG xwOBA BABIP Hard Hit% Bat Speed (MPH) Pull vs RHP 5.8% 96 9 .742 .498 .368 59.4% 79.3 Oppo vs RHP 2.6% 43 2 .687 .454 .341 58.1% 76.8 Pull vs LHP 2.5% 41 5 .672 .431 .333 46.3% 76.7 Oppo vs LHP 1.0% 16 0 .708 .492 .563 43.8% 72.7 What big signs can we see there? Look at the adjustment Caglianone is making against left-handed pitchers. What we see here is all about the outcome of the ball put in play. How does that .563 BABIP look? Yes, it has come on 16 balls in play, but the combination of BABIP and xwOBA has been fantastic, even with a lower bat speed. As we saw at the beginning, Caglianone has managed to find a highly productive balance once he does not get to pull. The correlation between BABIP and xSLG comes from his high hard-hit rates. Without a doubt, in the middle of such a disappointing season for the Royals, Caglianone’s big leap into the elite has become one of the most interesting stories of the entire season. The most encouraging thing is that he managed to unlock not only his power, but also an explosive aggressiveness that is leading to devastating contact. And all of that in a big leap during his second season at age 23. Of course, league adjustments will come, and some of that aggressiveness will have to adjust. But, for now, it is a pleasure to enjoy the feeling Caglianone is creating every time he is announced to step up to the plate. View full article

I don’t think this Massey profile gives us much hope that he can add more power. He is relying on more contact, especially by using the whole field, and that’s great. His on-base percentage continues to improve, and that could be very important for his offensive role in the lineup. If he can sustain the best part of these adjustments alongside his elite defense, this could be great news for the future. Thanks for reading and commenting!

Image courtesy of William Navarro-Imagn Images There are many doubts we can have around a baseball hitter, and one of the ones that creates the most expectations usually appears when he manages to erase one of his main problems at the plate. No matter how much he manages to distance himself from his historical inconsistencies, we remain attentive to the first sign of regression. Part of that narrative has been around Michael Massey's improvements in the batter's box this year, and we are already at the end of August. That means the final stretch of the season is approaching. At this point, many of the major trends among qualified hitters, whether good or bad, will be very difficult to reverse this late in the season. That makes Massey's story a much more reliable outcome. Throughout his career, since debuting with the Kansas City Royals in 2022, Massey has struggled against left-handed pitchers. Between 2022 and 2024, he averaged an 80 wRC+, with his improvement to 101 in 2024, but the following year he had the biggest drop of his career, recording just 41. His xSLG and xwOBA hit rock bottom, at .262 and .206, respectively. Massey's defensive ability at second base, forming a key combination with Bobby Witt Jr., along with his slight offensive impact against right-handed pitchers, justified part of his time as a starter. That story has taken a turn that seemed unsustainable, but has gradually become reality: Massey is posting a 140 wRC+, almost 100 points above his deepest drop last year, with an impressive .321/.346/.526 slash line, an .871 OPS and a .407 BABIP. Yes, it seems absurd, but he has increased his slugging by .249 points, his ISO by .162 (.205 from .043), his BABIP by .118 and his batting average by 87 points. Now, even more unusual is how he is doing it. Usually, this type of adjustment should be linked to better plate discipline, a higher contact rate both inside and outside the strike zone, and perhaps fewer strikeouts. What if I told you that Massey has done the exact opposite? It seems crazy, but he has broken all of those standards: his Contact% has fallen from 81.7% to 73.7%, his O-Contact% from 71.9% to 49.1%, he has increased his strikeout rate (K% from 18.4% to 25.6%) and has reduced his swings inside the strike zone by 9.1 percentage points (70.9% vs. 61.8%) compared with last year. Let's see how Massey has turned the tide in his favor in the lefty vs. lefty matchup, analyzing this 2025 vs. 2026 comparison: On the left, we have his 2025 heat map, and on the right, this season's. Notice how spread out the heat samples were last year. It is quite easy to notice how it has changed this year. This season, the intense heat points in the lower areas have a lot to do with the way Massey has hit the main pitches that neutralized him. In particular, he has made notable adjustments against sliders. Last year, his HardHit rate was just 22.2%, while Miss Distance reached 9.9, a combination that helps explain why his swing lost so much quality. This season, he has reduced that miss to an average of 3.2, with an xSLG of .438 and the highest hard-hit rate of his entire career (37.5%). His swings have not stopped being aggressive against sliders, and he has also paid the price with a 41.4% whiff rate, but the increase in quality at-bats has been worth it. Let's see here how Massey hit sliders. On the left are the results from this season. Compared with last year's samples, you can see how the opposition went back to attacking him in areas where they had controlled his swing. This year he has started to do damage in three different zones, two of them with an xBA above .750. Massey has received the highest percentage of pitches in the lower zones and toward the outside corner, so a key adjustment for him began by letting the pitches get to him. His bat speed stayed above 65 mph, and he also adjusted his launch angle from 21 degrees to 16. Against four-seam fastballs, the determining progress can be seen in IdealAtkAng%, which improved by 19.4%. Miss Distance has been reduced to 0.3, with better bat speed that has been reflected in a 4.6 increase in his HardHit% rate. Massey has also experienced improvements against the sinker, the pitch he was attacked with the most (4.4%) in 2025. This season, he has reduced his whiff rate by 7.1%, and his xSLG from .277 to .373. Look, there is something clear here, and that is that we do not know how long Massey will be able to maintain these adjustments. Left-handed pitchers have been throwing him too many fastballs and sliders, so I suspect that very soon we will begin to see a change in plan. Even so, the adjustment that could sustain this pace from Massey may be his total focus on contact. Since June, his BABIP has risen from .253 to .326, but the jump does not appear completely isolated: he is getting more line drives (24.6% from 13.3%), and his bat speed is allowing him to pull the ball more often (11.5%). For the first time, Massey is taking control in his matchups against left-handed pitchers, finally tasting the nectar of glory after walking back to the dugout with his head down so many times. Now it is no longer about knowing whether he can do it. The question is how long he will be able to sustain it. View full article

Image courtesy of Peter Aiken-Imagn Images When you watch Kansas City Royals right-hander Steven Cruz pitch, there are two conclusions we can draw without checking his Baseball Savant page: he has one of the fastest fastballs in the league, but his velocity still isn’t enough to dominate. Contrary to what Cruz’s 98.4 mph fastball average, the highest of his career and 96th percentile in velocity this season, invokes from the mound, hitters have a clear idea of how to take advantage of his shortcomings. Among the 16 qualified pitchers with at least 45 innings pitched and a 98 mph average fastball, Cruz has the fifth-best Whiff% (29%). Listen to the names ahead of him: Jacob Misiorowski (41.9%), Mason Miller (40.7%), Mason Montgomery (30.8%) and Juan Morillo (30.0%). He has left behind several elite relievers such as Adrian Morejon, Grant Taylor, Andrés Muñoz, Louis Varland, and Abner Uribe. Opponents have posted a .229 xBA against Cruz’s fastball, and with two strikes, it has accounted for 54.9% of his 51 strikeouts. On that side of the stat sheet, those numbers invoke a display of dominance. However, if we stay focused on that one part, we would not know the inconsistencies that have kept Cruz from making the jump to the first tier of the Royals’ bullpen. When we look at the other side, in reality, his fastball is not as dominant as those numbers suggest. There have been many situations in which Cruz has solved things with his high velocity, but his 147 wRC+ allowed exposes that his fastball has been more vulnerable in situations where he needs to avoid contact. Its Run Value is -2, and for the third consecutive year, its xSLG has climbed above .400. This year, opponents are hitting .409 xSLG against him, a figure that rises to .475 when the hitter is ahead in the count. The only situation in which Cruz’s fastball becomes unreachable is with two strikes, when opponents have gone 3-for-45, with no extra-base hits, and have struck out (28) in 57% of plate appearances (49). That said, there is no doubt that the fastball is not Cruz’s most dominant pitch. And that is the Dominican right-hander’s biggest assignment: he has one of the fastest fastballs in the game, but he still has not been able to turn that potential into becoming a dominant enough pitcher. For Cruz, who uses the fastball 55.5% of the time, this presents a bigger problem. His fastball should be the center of his arsenal and, around it, he should put the rest of his repertoire to work, which is reduced to just two more pitches: his cutter and slider. Fortunately for Cruz, the cutter has become his saving pitch: it has the only positive Run Value in his arsenal (5.0), produces ground balls 54.1% of the time, and the league averages just a 36 wRC+. The cutter has been his evolving weapon: he has improved its Whiff% to 32.2% this year, and reduced his Perfect Contact% from 28% last season to 18%, well below the 33% he allowed between 2023 and 2024. But there is one important aspect Cruz should work on around the cutter, and it comes as a consequence of an improvement by the opposition in increasing its Over rate to 23%. In 2024, the league averaged 4% against him, and 7% last year. To a large extent, that anticipation seems concerning, and it is not what usually happens when the hitter takes longer to identify the pitches, which could become an open door to contact. Part of that problem begins with Cruz’s slider, by far the most punished pitch in his arsenal. Opponents have posted a 157 wRC+ against it, making contact 92.3% of the time within the strike zone. The breakdown hitters are taking advantage of has a lot to do with the slider’s location, especially in the upper third of the strike zone. That poor history could explain Cruz’s reasonable lack of confidence, as he has lowered his slider usage from 11.1% in 2025 to 4.0% this season when hitters are ahead in the count. Without a real possibility of his highest-velocity pitch still standing out as his main weapon on the mound, the cutter has taken center stage in Cruz’s arsenal. However, at the same time, it has been overexposed because the slider is far from being a reliable pitch. That is Cruz’s dilemma. His potential brings us closer to the idea that he has enough to make the jump to the elite level, but the fastball that should drive his arsenal still hasn’t quite done it. The cutter has had to take on part of that role, while the slider’s problems continue to prevent him from sustaining that dominance. View full article

Image courtesy of Rick Osentoski-Imagn Images A couple of months ago, I analyzed Isaac Collins’ terrible start in his first season with the Kansas City Royals. The problem was evident: as a hitter, Collins depends on his contact ability, his ability to get on base, and the instincts he developed stealing bases during his final season with the Milwaukee Brewers. Contrary to that profile, the Collins we had seen through mid-June was having trouble putting the ball in play. His strikeouts increased by 4.7% compared to 2025, his slugging percentage dropped from .411 to .302, and his wRC+ (84) was below the league average. Collins is not a hitter who finds success hitting fly balls, so there was an obvious problem in his swing: his fly-ball rate jumped from 34.3% to 50.4%. As he approached the third month of the season, it was time to make adjustments. The big question here was how Collins was going to solve his main inconsistency. Was it worth changing his plan as a hitter? What part of his approach at the plate needed an immediate adjustment? In the two months since the last time we analyzed him, Collins found answers. For many hitters, it might seem reasonable to work on their plate discipline, be less aggressive and more selective, especially as a switch-hitter. Collins did the opposite: he turned aggression outside the zone into better contact. How did he do it? Let’s begin by looking at some revealing numbers: PERIOD K% xSLG BABIP Whiff% Hard-Hit% O-Swing% O-Contact% Contact% Opening Day to 6/12/2026 25.8 .308 .295 26.0 39.6 21.9% 53.1% 76.5% 6/13/2026 to 8/13/2026 17.1 .352 .295 16.8 40.8 26.7% 67.0% 83.8% DIFFERENCE -8.7 .044 .000 -9.2 1.2 4.8% 13.9% 7.3% Everything revolved around contact, but the key was not greater bat speed or a jump in power. Collins has given his season a positive turn since June 13 with greater aggression at the plate. His biggest increase in a metric was the 13.9% increase in O-Contact%, while he reduced his strikeout and Whiff rates. The quality of contact was also key to improving his xSLG from .308 to .352, while maintaining the same .295 BABIP. Yes, this really is not what is expected from a hitter who went through struggles at the beginning of the season. However, the adjustment process itself is nothing new for Collins. In the sample since 2025, he appears among the hitters with the greatest ability to generate value against pitches outside the strike zone: his .514 xOBP ranks sixth among qualified hitters who have seen at least 250 pitches outside the zone. Player xOBP Whiff% Barrel/BBE% Perdomo, Geraldo .568 24.4 1.3 Torres, Gleyber .567 39.1 2.2 Tucker, Kyle .562 41.9 2.3 Soto, Juan .540 40.9 8.1 Grisham, Trent .538 43.1 5.0 Collins, Isaac .514 49.7 0.0 Ward, Taylor .505 49.4 1.2 Vargas, Miguel .500 32.7 3.7 Bregman, Alex .500 32.4 0.8 Acuña Jr., Ronald .497 42.5 5.3 In the Top 10, there are two aspects that perfectly reveal Collins’ profile: he is the hitter with the highest Whiff% rate and the only one with 0.0 Barrel/BBE%. And there is the real story of his adjustment. As a hitter, Collins has remained faithful to the approach that made him an interesting piece for an offense that has achieved the highest Z-Contact% (86.1) in all of Major League Baseball this season. The big question that remains here is whether Collins can sustain this success by living off continued aggression and contact against pitches outside the strike zone. His xwOBA has not had an alarming drop (it went from .305 to .299 during the period of these last two months), while his Barrel% went from 7.5% to 4.0%. Since we already know that Collins’ philosophy is to live off contact, I investigated what the most notable differences have been within his recent offensive rebound. I focused more on his plate appearances against right-handed pitchers, since we have a larger sample there during the two periods we are analyzing. Opening Day to June 12 June 13 To August 13 Collins shows better performance in the second period, accumulating a value of +3.8 over +2.4. His hitting profile was more balanced, especially outside the strike zone, where contact has made the difference since June 13. Let’s look at some of those contacts against pitches up and outside the strike zone. Date: 2026-06-10. Pitcher: Gray, Peyton. Count: 1 – 2. Pitch Type: CH. Velocity: 84.5. URL: Isaac Collins doubles (8) on a line drive to left fielder Wyatt Langford. | Baseball Savant Videos | baseballsavant.com Date: 2026-06-19. Pitcher: McGreevy, Michael. Count: 1 – 2. Pitch Type: FF. Velocity: 91.9. URL: Isaac Collins' two-run double | Baseball Savant Videos | baseballsavant.com Two pieces of hitting in the Collins style! This season, only 18 left-handed hitters have hit a double with a pitch located in that same area. Shohei Ohtani leads the league with four. Collins is in the group of 15 hitters who have two. It is not so easy to get a piece of hitting like that. But for Collins, that is not the point that matters. He will go after pitches outside the strike zone. In these last two months, that has been his best adjustment, and he has gotten many more quality at-bats. We will see if his swing will continue to stay alive outside the zone. The Royals, despite having been in a terrible season, brought Collins in to continue being faithful to his style. 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Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images I don’t know if this has happened to you, but sometimes small samples can cause panic. Throughout his major league career, right-hander Randy Dobnak has had a few of them. The first time I saw Dobnak pitch this season was on July 2, during his debut with the Royals in relief against the Tampa Bay Rays at Kauffman Stadium. He entered after a terrible 42-pitch second inning from Stephen Kolek. The Tampa Bay Rays had taken a 3-0 lead. With Dobnak coming onto the mound, I had the feeling that his inning would be the inevitable reason to stop watching the game. I watched a couple more batters; Dobnak fell behind 2-1 in the count against Junior Caminero, but got him out on a groundball with a high sinker. One out. The next batter, Víctor Mesa Jr., grounded out to second on the first pitch, against a sinker on the outside corner. When it looked like everything was going to be fine, Chandler Simpson and Cedric Mullins collected back-to-back singles, and Taylor Walls walked. Bases loaded. On the first pitch, Richie Palacios missed a sinker away and hit a fly ball to left field. With a little scare, Dobnak escaped the third inning without allowing a run. He dominated the next five opponents and reached the fifth inning with two outs. Who cared about exit velocities? The man was getting outs! But just when everything seemed calm, Simpson and Mullins caught up with the sinker. Single and home run. The Rays extended their lead to 5-1. In the following inning, Dobnak allowed two more hits, but a great throw home by Isaac Collins cut down Hunter Feduccia at the plate to end the inning. Dobnak’s Royals debut was over. He threw four innings, allowing two runs with two strikeouts and one walk. He had seven baserunners and allowed two of them to score. That first look at Dobnak perfectly described the version of the pitcher he has been in the majors. When you look at his weapons against opposing hitters, you realize the contradiction contained in his profile: a pitcher whose fastball barely reaches 92 mph, with an insignificant strikeout rate and a lurking volume of contact allowed in the zone. Taken together, there is nothing that looks more vulnerable in a league where velocity and stuff occupy a central place. His 2021 season with the Minnesota Twins, when he had his biggest role as a reliever, confirms that reading with certainty: his hard-hit rate ranked in the first percentile of the league, along with a 10.3% barrel rate and a 6.81 xERA. So, how can a pitcher with that profile survive now? What were the desperate Royals looking at when they brought in Dobnak? Those were some of the inevitable questions following his debut in early July. The answer begins with his sinker, a pitch he uses 39.8% of the time. Yes, as contradictory as it may seem, the sinker is the starting point. When you look at Dobnak’s splits by count, there are some surprising things. Opponents have posted a .577 xSLG when ahead in the count, with a tiny 4.2% Whiff rate. Yet the result behind that devastating average tells another story. Batter Run Value tells us that the sinker is not being punished throughout the entire zone. There are six of the eight areas of the strike zone where the opposition has negative values. The efficiency inside the strike zone responds to the value that seems hidden in Dobnak’s sinker: his ability to generate groundballs. He does not have elite velocity or the ability to generate swings and misses frequently, but he makes up for that difference with location. And when opponents make contact, here is the success: he induces groundballs more than 67% of the time. Contrary to what we might believe when looking at the sinker’s results, Dobnak’s location problem has been outside the strike zone. Alongside the sinker, the sweeper and his changeup are the pitches that strengthen the plan. With the sweeper, Dobnak has posted his highest Whiff rate (35.5%), making it his two-strike weapon, while the changeup is his most efficient pitch. When opponents make contact with the sweeper, the xSLG jumps to .448, making it even more vulnerable than the sinker (.444). Against the changeup? Just .278, with an average exit velocity of 83.1 mph. The sweeper is most effective when it is out of the hitter’s reach, but when Dobnak misses with it, the result has been terrifying. Bat Tracking data helps explain why that difference is so important. Hitters have averaged a 4.6-inch Miss Distance against Dobnak’s sweeper, while the four-seam fastball (0.9) and sinker (2.0) remain the pitches opponents read best. The Perfect Contact% against the sinker (47%) and fastball (42%) is at its worst for Dobnak, but his ability to generate groundballs and maintain location on the corners has prevented major problems. That explains how Dobnak can survive without velocity, and I believe his uncommon profile was the reason the Royals have tested him as a starter. The result, considering his arsenal, has been surprising. Dobnak has allowed more than one run in only one start, and it came in his most recent outing, on August 9 against the Cubs. He has allowed just one home run against 136 opponents, has a .271 BABIP, and maintains a 55.1% groundball rate. His 2.00 ERA tells a story of success since he arrived in Kansas City, while his 4.79 xERA predicts that he has been too lucky. In an era when velocity has become a pitcher’s indispensable antidote, every inch matters for Dobnak because he does not have many other tools to compensate for a bad location. View full article

Image courtesy of Vincent Carchietta-Imagn Images Two strikes should put the hitter on the defensive, but against the Kansas City bullpen, the exact opposite happens. The issue isn't getting ahead; it's finding the pitch to finish the plate appearance. A drop in secondary pitch effectiveness has completely eliminated the uncertainty in the batter's box. Without a breaking or offspeed offering that threatens the zone, hitters get comfortable, extend at-bats, and drive the ball hard—wiping out late-inning leads in the process. The numbers don't lie about the collapse: the Royals bullpen sits at the bottom of Major League Baseball with a disastrous -3.5 WAR and the lowest xERA (4.93) in the American League. They surrender 1.49 home runs per nine innings—the highest rate in MLB—while opponents punish them with a 40.4% hard-hit rate. This isn't a temporary slump limited to a couple of arms; it's a structural flaw in how the unit attempts to close out games. A year ago, a breaking pitch below the zone forced hitters to make split-second decisions. Today, they lay off with ease because they know the next pitch will have to come over the plate. Lucas Erceg's case illustrates it perfectly. Armed with a fastball that averages 97.2 mph, Erceg should freeze hitters when he's ahead in the count. Instead, his changeup has turned into a non-threat, yielding an astronomical 1.000 slugging percentage without generating a single strikeout. That means that, in that situation, the hitter can forget about emergency contact and most of the time look to do maximum damage against the changeup. That ineffective changeup disrupted his entire sequence. With one fewer variable to worry about, opposing batters no longer need to cover the bottom edge and can gear up early for the heater. The result is a damning .387 wOBA on Erceg's two-strike fastball. The velocity is still there. The deception is gone. John Schreiber, the most trusted and heavily used arm in the corps, reflects the very same issue. On paper, his 3.64 ERA (which drops to a microscopic 1.11 at home) masks the underlying damage. But when Schreiber gets ahead in the count and goes for his put-away pitch outside the zone, he loses command of the edges. The result has been so alarming that hitters have raised their meatball swing percentage to 83%, the highest mark of any season in his career with at least 700 pitches. Matt Strahm tells a similar tale. His slider lost its bite on the corners, allowing hitters to spit on it and sit dead-red on a fastball he is forced to throw for strikes—a pitch they are crushing to a .526 slugging percentage. Nick Mears represents the most extreme case. Every single home run he has surrendered would have left all 30 ballparks. Alex Lange and Eli Morgan exhibit the same trend, albeit on a smaller scale. Home runs aren't the problem. They are the visible consequence of everything that happened before. To save the final third of the game, Kansas City has had to turn to arms capable of dictating the pace of the matchup again through the quality of their secondary offerings. Enter Daniel Lynch IV and Steven Cruz, two relievers who regained control of plate appearances in different ways. While others try to impose themselves with the fastball, Lynch forces hitters to account for more than one possibility. Riding a sinker that holds opponents to a .140 average and a slider generating a 44.1% whiff rate, Lynch doesn't need dazzling velocity to survive because he keeps hitters off balance. In his game plan, that uncertainty has been worth more this year than a couple of extra miles per hour. Cruz, for his part, regained control by adding a cutter that forced opponents to account for two different speeds. Holding opponents to a .149 average with that pitch, his 98.6 mph fastball is making an impact again: hitters have to think twice before starting their swing. That is the flaw exposing this bullpen. Surrendering 1.53 home runs per nine innings alongside a 40.6% hard-hit rate is the consequence of running out of put-away pitches. The moment a hitter realizes the secondary pitch is no longer a threat, the at-bat no longer belongs to the pitcher. View full article

Image courtesy of IMAGN IMAGES via Reuters Connect Vinnie Pasquantino's season is a reminder that controlling the strike zone is not enough when a hitter loses the ability to impact the baseball. He continues to make the decisions you'd expect from a middle-of-the-order hitter, but those decisions no longer produce the same kind of contact. The Royals first baseman rarely chases pitches outside the zone, owns a solid 11.0% walk rate, and makes contact on more than 90% of the pitches he sees in the strike zone. The swing that turned that disciplined approach into legitimate power over the past few seasons, however, is no longer producing the same results. Pasquantino's decline in bat speed has changed how left-handed pitchers can attack him. Against lefties, Pasquantino averages just 66.5 mph in bat speed—ranking in the fifth percentile across Major League Baseball. That has given opposing pitchers far more freedom to challenge him up and in or work the lower part of the strike zone without taking the same risks they once did. Pitches that previously demanded precise execution can now be thrown with much greater confidence because Pasquantino takes longer to get the barrel to the ball. The heat map illustrates that vulnerability. Outside of two quadrants in the upper portion of the strike zone, nearly the entire chart is shaded blue against left-handed pitching, including the area tight to his hands and much of the lower zone. Pitchers no longer need to live on the edges of the strike zone. They can attack him directly because that swing no longer punishes those pitches. The change is also evident in the type of contact he produces. Pasquantino still puts the ball in play, but he no longer moves the barrel through the zone with enough acceleration to transfer the same amount of energy at contact. The swing that once produced authoritative pulled fly balls to right field has largely disappeared against left-handed pitching. His PullAir% has fallen to 17.3%, while only 1.8% of his swings now qualify as Blast Swings. The split tells the story: Pitcher Split xwOBA Hard-Hit% Barrel% Bat Speed Whiff% vs. RHP .357 45.8% 7.9% 68.7 mph 13.8% vs. LHP .240 22.0% 1.7% 66.5 mph 22.4% Against right-handed pitching, Pasquantino still looks like the middle-of-the-order hitter the Royals expected, posting a .357 xwOBA alongside a 45.8% Hard-Hit rate. Against lefties, the profile changes completely. The drop in impact explains the rest of his offensive line: his Hard-Hit rate falls to 22.0%, barrels nearly disappear (1.7%), and his isolated power (ISO) has fallen from .211 to .113 compared to last season. Even his maximum exit velocity has declined from 114.4 mph to 108.1 mph. The change is also visible in his batted-ball profile, as 16.7% of his fly balls never even leave the infield. Pasquantino's season serves as a reminder that controlling the strike zone alone is not enough to sustain power. His plate discipline has returned to an elite level. The problem begins only after he decides to swing. As long as that physical gap remains, he'll continue to build quality plate appearances and lay off pitches he can't drive. What he can no longer guarantee—especially against left-handed pitching—is the kind of contact that makes a power-hitting first baseman the centerpiece of an offense and the hitter capable of changing a game with a single swing. View full article

Image courtesy of IMAGN IMAGES via Reuters Connect Let’s get this much straight: Alex Lange owns a 1-6 record and a 6.33 ERA across 42 ⅔ innings. It is exactly the kind of stat line that gets filed away as a decline after about two seconds of evaluation. But in Lange’s case, the ERA is telling an incomplete story: in save opportunities, he has posted a solid 3.75 ERA over 12 innings; outside of those situations, that number jumps to an ugly 7.34 across 30 ⅔ innings. Opposing hitters are batting just .198 against him from the eighth through ninth innings, but in every other situation, they are hitting .355. The leverage table explains that gap much better than the save column: Leverage Index BB% K-BB% HR/9 FIP xFIP Low Leverage 13.5% 9.6% 0.00 3.24 4.64 Medium Leverage 12.2% 8.2% 3.60 8.11 4.75 High Leverage 10.0% 15.0% 0.00 2.88 4.83 His walk rate steadily declines from 13.5% to 10.0% as the situation becomes more demanding, while his strikeout-minus-walk rate (K-BB%) reaches its highest point of the season (15.0%) exactly when the game demands his best pitches. This is not a pitcher losing command in the ninth inning. It is a location problem that appears outside those highest-pressure moments. The spike in Lange’s FIP during medium-leverage situations (8.11, compared with 3.24 in low leverage and 2.88 in high leverage) comes from one specific factor: a sudden jump in home runs allowed, with a 3.60 HR/9 mark. When we turn to xFIP — the metric that normalizes home run rate — the illusion fades: 4.64, 4.75 and 4.83. The league is seeing a pitcher profile that looks much more similar across all three situations than the results suggest; the numbers are mostly reflecting where those damaging home runs happened to cluster. That is where the repertoire tells the story that innings alone cannot explain. His fastballs are responsible for most of his damaging contact: he is allowing exit velocities above 93 mph in the upper areas of the strike zone, exactly the type of location where mistakes with his fastball become the easiest to punish. Meanwhile, his slider (32.1% usage) and his new cutter (12.1%) have not allowed a single home run this season (0.0% HR/FB). This is not a mental breakdown halfway through a game; it is that when Lange’s fastballs miss, they miss up and over the middle of the plate, and those mistakes have been concentrated in medium-leverage situations. That is the most important part of the story: this increased vulnerability in the air is the direct cost of a repertoire transition. In 2022, when Lange was built around a devastating knuckle-curve that accounted for nearly half of his pitches, he generated ground balls on 55.6% of balls in play. After eliminating the curveball completely beginning in 2023, his ground-ball rate has fallen to 42.9%. Lange went from being a pitcher who survived by keeping the ball on the ground to one who now relies more on hitters missing. That approach can work, but it comes with a smaller margin for error when mistakes start traveling in the air. With Kansas City controlling him through arbitration until the 2027 season, the question for the front office is not the surface-level appearance of a 6.33 ERA. It is whether Alex Lange has stopped being effective or whether he has simply become a different pitcher, with a different set of strengths and risks than the one who made him valuable in the first place. Everything points toward the latter: his command improves when the pressure rises, his most damaging contact is concentrated in two identifiable pitches, and his xFIP suggests a much more stable underlying profile. The solution for Matt Quatraro and his coaching staff is not to lose faith in Lange in the ninth inning. It is to understand when his fastball is being exposed and avoid putting him in those middle-inning situations where one misplaced pitch can change the game in a single swing. View full article