Yirsandy Rodríguez

Throughout the first half of the season, it felt as if Vinnie Pasquantino was far away from the hitter who, in 2025, became the third left-handed hitter in Royals history to have a 30-home-run, 30-double season. That season, he also hit home runs in five consecutive games, from August 18-22. Vinnie got off to a slow start and then missed 40 games due to two separate stints on the injured list: first, from June 14 to July 9, with a fracture of the right hamate bone; then, from July 29 to August 16, with discomfort in his right wrist. The only month in which he recorded more than 100 wRC+ during the first half was June, with 118, when his slugging seemed to awaken as he surpassed .400 for the first time, reaching .426. However, he fell back to 95 wRC+ in July and finished that first stretch with a line of just .222/.308/.345, six home runs, 32 RBIs, and 80 wRC+. Last year, in what could be considered the best season of his career, Pasquantino reached the All-Star Game break with 15 home runs, 56 RBIs, and 109 wRC+. Much of the trouble was due to the combination of breaking pitches, especially sweepers and sliders. Vinnie did not hit any home runs in 72 plate appearances that ended with a breaking pitch, while his BABIP fell to .145, his xBA to .209, and his xSLG remained at just .320. The problem was not limited to his expected statistics: the quality of his contact also suffered, with a Barrel/BBE rate of 3.6%. This is where part of the problem that followed Vinnie throughout that first stretch begins to emerge: his lack of consistency against left-handed pitchers. It has always been one of his weaknesses, and opponents keep going back to it. In his career, Pasquantino averages just 81 wRC+ against lefties, with a batting line of .236/.293/.368. He has had only one season in which he produced consistently against them: precisely his debut season in the Major Leagues, in 2022, when he recorded an .854 OPS and 148 wRC+, although in just 65 plate appearances. At that point, the season seemed irrecoverable. However, Pasquantino managed to make adjustments against left-handed pitchers and completely changed the course of his campaign. He finished the second half with a .294/.374/.563 line and 157 wRC+. In addition, he tied for second in MLB with 22 RBIs in September and, even more revealingly, put together good at-bats against lefties. From June 3 through the end of the season, Pasquantino tied for fifth in the American League in OPS, at .902, among hitters with a minimum of 200 at-bats. He trailed only four players, including the leader, Yordan Alvarez, at 1.013. His 15.2% whiff rate in 2026 ranked in the 92nd percentile, an improvement over his 18.2% mark in 2025. After being reinstated from the injured list on August 17, he struck out just 16 times in 145 plate appearances. His 11.0% strikeout rate ranked seventh in the American League, behind Chandler Simpson's 5.4% mark. Let’s now analyze some of his tendencies and how his approach at the plate may have led him to achieve these results. Season PA BB% K% AVG OBP SLG OPS ISO BABIP wOBA wRC+ O-Swing% Z-Swing% Swing% O-Contact% Z-Contact% Contact% Zone% SwStr% 1st Half 83 7.2% 24.1% .145 .217 .184 .401 .039 .196 .190 11 31.5% 63.50% 47.7% 72.5% 85.8% 81.5% 50.8% 8.8% 2nd Half 50 8.0% 12.0% .311 .360 .556 .916 .244 .316 .389 149 33.0% 66.70% 50.5% 75.9% 92.2% 87.1% 52.2% 6.5% The statistics in this table compare the first and second halves of the season, exclusively against left-handed pitchers. As you can see, the jump in production was brutal: he went from 11 wRC+ to 149, with an increase of .372 points in slugging and .515 in OPS. Vinnie changed the course of his at-bats by being a little more aggressive against pitches both inside and outside the zone. His contact improved in both metrics, with increases of 3.4 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively, while he reduced his SwStr% rate by 2.3 percentage points. Remember his problems against breaking balls during the first half? He pulverized them in the second half, and raised his xBA to .319 and his xSLG to .876, with a Barrel/BBE rate of 44.4%. Let’s now look at Pasquantino’s two heat maps. On the left, we have Vinnie’s results against breaking pitches during the second half of the season; on the right, his report against left-handed pitchers over that same period. The first map shows his aggressiveness and the damage he managed to do in the lower part of the zone, as well as against pitches that moved away from him and sought to attack the outer corners. I love Vinnie’s swing when he is in sync and identifies those pitches well: he lets them travel, as he usually does, and then unleashes his swing. In the other map, the offensive heat is concentrated in a point farther away, near the outer corner. I reviewed all of Vinnie’s at-bats against lefties since the All-Star break. We have already seen some of the most revealing statistics, but I wanted to dig deeper into what he accomplished when he hit the ball to the opposite field or found a pitch he could punish. He was also devastating. In the second half of the season, he hit just 26 balls of that type: 18 to his pull side and eight to the opposite field. He recorded a .375 BABIP in both groups, with 143 and 286 wRC+, respectively. Granted, it is a small sample. But it is part of a much more revealing picture and helps explain one of the factors that set Pasquantino’s season on a path toward a very different outcome at the plate. Image courtesy of Natalie Reid-Imagn Images View full article

I agree! The key will be how Jensen adjusts when pitchers start attacking the edges and working higher in the zone. He showed he can make adjustments during the season, so it’ll be interesting to see how he builds on that over the winter. If he can stay patient and make those adjustments, his power could become even more dangerous next season.

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images Well, you already know how great the kid is. Carter Jensen finished the season among the American League rookie leaders in doubles (1st, 35), extra-base hits (1st, 64), RBIs (2nd, 81), home runs (3rd, 27), slugging percentage (3rd, .467), walks (3rd, 65), total bases (3rd, 246), hits (5th, 126), and OPS (5th, .790). He hit 27 home runs in 149 games, surpassing Bob Hamelin (24 HR in 1994) to establish the Royals rookie home run record, and led all Royals with 81 RBIs, becoming the third Kansas City rookie to lead the team in that category, joining Bobby Witt Jr. in 2022 (80) and Hamelin in 1994 (65). His 81 RBIs were the third-highest total in a rookie season in Royals history, behind Carlos Beltran’s 108 in 1999 and Kevin Seitzer’s 83 in 1987. The power he unleashed at the plate took him to another level, but what I want to analyze here is Jensen’s legitimate impact as a power hitter and how much he can improve in the future. So there are two things to start with here. First, one of the most interesting trends Jensen unleashed alongside his power was finishing in the 86th percentile in Average Exit Velocity, the 85th in Barrel%, and the 77th in Batting Run Value. It was his 84th-percentile Chase% rating combined with plate discipline that led him to finish in the 73rd percentile in BB%. It is not what you often expect from a hitter who is just 23 years old, especially considering this was a continuation of an initial 69-plate-appearance sample last year. And, well, it actually was, but now that Jensen has been able to extend his plate discipline across 603 trips to the plate, some of our doubts have been answered. Second, how Jensen adjusted to bounce back after a slow start in which he hit just seven home runs and posted a .368 slugging percentage over his first 59 games. He changed part of his mechanics over the rest of the way, starting in July. Jensen adjusted his stance in the batter’s box, moving 2.1 inches closer to the plate, moving 1.2 inches forward in the box, and increasing his stance angle from 6° to 19°, adopting a more open stance. These changes coincided with his offensive resurgence over the rest of the way, as he hit 20 home runs and produced a 136 wRC+ in 388 plate appearances over the rest of the way. So, after a first half of the season with a 97 wRC+, Jensen propelled himself forward and ultimately unleashed his power after the All-Star break, raising his ISO from .184 to .289 and his walk rate from 9.0% to 13.2% to produce a 141 wRC+. He was named American League Player of the Month for September and became the first catcher in Royals history to receive that monthly recognition, an award established in 1974. He led the Major Leagues in September in doubles (10), extra-base hits (19), slugging percentage (.787), and OPS (1.194). His 63 total bases led the American League, and his eight home runs tied for second in that league. Jensen quickly established himself as a fastball destroyer, producing 17 of his 27 home runs against three types of fastballs, 10 against four-seamers, five against cutters, and two against sinkers. That was not the end of the story, as 33 of his 64 extra-base hits also came against fastballs, accounting for 51.6%. Although Jensen recorded a positive Run Value of 1 against four-seam fastballs, he struck out in 36.3% of his 182 at-bats and finished with just a .156 xBA. He also struggled at the plate against sliders and sweepers, finishing with negative values of -2 and -5, respectively. So his power was also limited against some breaking balls and off-speed pitches, although the biggest problem was in some of the locations where Jensen was pitched. Let’s look at the heat map of his home runs. As you can see here, Jensen rarely got a pitch that wasn’t middle-middle or near the lower, inside part of the zone. He hit only two of his home runs on pitches in the upper third of the strike zone, and just one on a high pitch outside the zone. In other words, he was a destroyer of command mistakes or, in other cases, pitches that tried to challenge him by attempting to get through the middle of the plate. That said, let’s now look at the map of the zones where Jensen had the highest whiff percentages against right-handed and left-handed pitchers. Well, let’s keep in mind before we begin that Jensen had an interesting split against lefties. He posted a higher BABIP against them (.330 compared to .279 against righties), but his power production was much lower, with his slugging falling from .507 to .368. Let’s move on and take a look at the pair of charts, which include every pitch Jensen has seen in his first two seasons. On the left is Jensen’s chart against left-handed pitchers, and you can see how he missed most often inside the zone when they pitched to the edges, especially on high pitches. And then, although many of the percentages outside the zone came on pitches in a smaller proportion, he also regularly had problems with pitches away. On the right, the story changes a little, as Jensen posted a 127 wRC+ and had a better BB/K ratio of 0.44 compared to 0.26 against lefties. If you look closely, you’ll see that against right-handers, Jensen’s swings and misses decreased against pitches on the outer edges and in the lower zones, and you already know how he destroyed the pitches he could take advantage of in the middle. The big question I ask myself here is how Jensen will adjust when the league starts pitching to him much more effectively on the corners and in the upper third of the strike zone, trying to limit so many vulnerable pitches in the middle of the plate, especially fastballs. Will he continue to maintain his approach without trying to chase too much? Will he give up a little of his 23.1 Pull/AIR%? Or will he keep looking for ways to crush pitches instead of prioritizing contact a little more? Personally, I would like the Royals to take much greater advantage of his power, perhaps by using him in another lineup spot where he can get more at-bats with runners on base, but I also love the idea of seeing him step up to the plate as the leadoff hitter, bringing the feeling that the game could start with a home run. View full article

Image courtesy of Denny Medley-Imagn Images The pitching of the Kansas City Royals was a collective disaster all year, above all because of the problems of a bullpen that never managed to sustain itself. So we have arrived at complicated territory. The Royals lost 44 games in which they had a lead in 2026, one fewer than the Angels (45), who recorded the highest number in the American League. They wasted a lead in 47.3% of their losses (44 of 93), the fifth-highest rate in the American League. In 2025, Kansas City had the best record in the major leagues with a 73-0 record when they came into the ninth inning with a lead, but they lost eight games in that situation in 2026, the third-highest number in the majors. They also suffered 13 losses when they had a lead after the seventh inning, tying for third place in the league, and 10 walk-off losses, tying for the fourth-worst result, one behind the Tigers and Yankees (11 each), who recorded the highest number in the American League. The narrow margins were a problem all year. Really, when you lose a lot of games like that, pitching is not the only culprit, but in the case of the Royals, in pressure situations, pitching found it very difficult to contain their opponents. They finished with 108 of their 162 games decided by three runs or fewer (66.7%), one fewer than the Cleveland Guardians (109), who recorded the highest number in the Major Leagues. It was their highest figure since 2013 (113), and they had a record of just 46-62 (.426) in those games, the fifth-worst record in all of the Majors. Their 62 losses in those conditions were only one fewer than those of the Tigers and Angels (63), who recorded the highest number in MLB. Even so, there were some interesting stories to highlight, especially those of these three pitchers I chose here. 3. Daniel Lynch IV, LHP Daniel completed his sixth major league season in 2026, with a 6-6 record and a 4.08 ERA (39 earned runs in 86 innings) in 56 games, 10 of them as a starter. His 13 holds left him tied with Matt Strahm in second place among Royals relievers, only behind John Schreiber (14). But the big story of his season changed when the team began to use him as a starter. Lynch IV became the first pitcher in Royals history to participate in at least 40 games as a reliever and make at least 10 starts in the same season. He was one of three major league pitchers who reached those figures in 2026, alongside Lake Bachar and Braydon Fisher. Lynch IV began the season in the Royals’ bullpen, where he recorded a 1.96 ERA (10 earned runs in 46 innings) in 46 games. It was the fourth-lowest ERA by a Royals left-hander in his first 46 appearances of a season, behind José Mijares (1.72) in 2012, Tom Burgmeier (1.75) in 1971, and Ron Mahay (1.78) in 2008. He allowed only two home runs in 46.0 innings as a reliever (0.4 HR/9), a figure tied for the sixth-best mark among American League relievers (minimum of 40 games). While the Royals were looking for alternatives to complete a rotation very affected by injuries during the season, Lynch IV moved into the rotation on August 7 against the Cubs. It was his first start since May 27, 2025, against Cincinnati. However, in his 10 starts, he allowed nine home runs in 40 innings (2.0 HR/9), and his FIP was affected, going from 3.06 to 6.17. He did not overcome the pressure of facing the opposing batting order more than once, seeing his K-BB% rate fall from 12.6% to 4.0%. Even so, Lynch IV completed at least five innings in four of his five September starts, including the last one of the year, on September 27 against Cleveland, when he worked 5 ⅓ innings, his highest total in a start during the season. He got consecutive wins on September 9 against Arizona and September 16 in Houston. They were his first wins as a starter since July 18, 2023, against Detroit. Lynch IV limited left-handed hitters to a .165/.223/.248 slash line (20-for-121). Among American League pitchers, his .223 OBP allowed ranked fourth and his .165 batting average allowed ranked sixth (minimum of 100 batters faced). Lynch IV ranked in the 83rd percentile in breakings and the 79th percentile in GB% with 47.8%, and his two main weapons were the sinker and the slider. With the sinker, he recorded +7 Run Value and allowed only a .210 AVG, .300 SLG, and .304 wOBA. Although the slider was not one of the pitches he used the most, he used it only 19.4% of the time and managed to limit his opponents to a .132/.165/.211 slash line (10-for-76). His batting average allowed was tied with San Diego’s Mason Miller as the best in the major leagues against the slider (minimum of 75 at-bats). 2. Noah Cameron, LHP The best of his season is far from his 9-8 record and 4.11 ERA (81 earned runs in 177 ⅓ innings) in 31 appearances, the highest number of his career, 30 of them as a starter. After making his major league debut on April 30, 2025, Cameron was one of four Royals players who made the Opening Day roster for the first time in 2026, alongside Tyler Tolbert, Jac Caglianone, and Carter Jensen. His consistency pitching for a team whose hopes of winning increasingly seemed smaller revealed a lot about Cameron’s ability to compete, as he was one of 15 left-handed pitchers who made at least 30 starts in 2026. His 177 ⅓ innings ranked sixth among left-handers, behind Philadelphia’s Cristopher Sánchez (207 innings). Cameron completed at least eight innings in three starts, all during his last 11 outings. That figure was tied with Cam Schlittler as the highest in the American League and was one behind Sandy Alcantara, Logan Webb, and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, who led the major leagues with four each. After beginning his career with 43 consecutive starts, Noah pitched as a reliever behind opener Beck Way on July 24 in Detroit. He worked seven innings without allowing a run and struck out eight batters. But beyond that dominance, that game marked a before and after in his campaign. After that performance, Cameron revealed that he had started choosing his own pitches through the PitchCom device. This turned out to be a turning point in his season, recording a 2.58 ERA (22 earned runs in 76 ⅔ innings) in his last 12 games, 11 of them as a starter, after having recorded a 5.27 ERA (59 earned runs in 100 ⅔ innings) in his first 19 starts. Cameron recorded a 3.92 FIP, lower than his 4.11 ERA, a difference of 0.19. Among qualified American League pitchers, that difference between his ERA and his FIP ranked as the tenth-highest—the leader was Jacob deGrom, with 1.09. He achieved it with several quality pitches. His cutter added +8 Run Value, finishing in the 94th percentile in RV/100 pitches, and opponents hit only .156/.200/.270 (19-for-122) against his curveball. That .156 batting average was the best in the American League and the third-best in the majors (minimum of 100 at-bats), only behind Nolan McLean (.130) and Braxton Ashcraft (.135). However, the slider and the sinker were his two weakest pitches, finishing with -5 and -3 Run Value, and a slugging percentage allowed of .490 and .636, respectively. Cameron recorded a streak of 19.0 consecutive innings without allowing runs, the best of his career, from August 16 to 27. He also established a personal record with 48 ⅔ consecutive innings without allowing home runs, from July 19 to August 27. 1. Michael Wacha, RHP This was the problem all the time: Wacha received an average of 3.36 runs of offensive support in his 32 starts, the lowest figure for a starter in the major leagues. It was the second consecutive year in which he had the lowest average offensive run support among starters. Then, when you see Wacha’s dominance and success as a rotation starter, I think you appreciate the effort and consistency even more, offering the opportunity to win almost every day. Among starters with at least 20 starts, only Yoshinobu Yamamoto (22/28, 78.6%), Chris Sale (19/27, 70.4%), Sonny Gray (20/29, 69.0%), and Cristopher Sanchez (22/33, 66.7%) surpassed Wacha (21/32, 65.6%) in quality start percentage. We can see a lot of run prevention and dominance numbers, but baseball is as complicated as it is simple, so often what teams need most is for their starters to be able to get a quality start. Wacha has done that for a long time. He strung together five consecutive quality starts from May 4 to 25, matching the second-longest streak of that kind in his career. His longest streak was seven consecutive starts, from July 26 to August 28, 2015, when he played for St. Louis. He won four consecutive starts from August 17 to September 3, matching the best streak of his career. He was the only Royals pitcher who won four consecutive starts in 2026. Once again, Wacha’s devastating changeup was the main weapon in his arsenal, ranking in the 98th percentile in Run Value with +11, the sixth-best mark in all of the majors. His opponents hit just .188 AVG, with .321 SLG and .225 xwOBA. His fastball (+5 RV) and cutter (+2) helped maintain the balance in his repertoire, but the slider (-2) and the curveball (-6) have once again been exposed. In the last two seasons, although Wacha has thrown the slider and the curveball only 19.3% of the time, both pitches have combined for a negative Run Value of -9, even though they continue to generate his highest whiff rates—29.3% with the slider and 27.8% with the curveball. He made his 300th career start on May 31, 2026, in Texas. He became the tenth active pitcher to reach that figure and the sixth who made his 300th start with Kansas City. He recorded the 1,500th strikeout of his career on June 27 against the White Sox, becoming the 17th active pitcher to reach that mark. View full article

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images When you look at it from a collective standpoint, the Kansas City Royals’ season was a disappointment. They finished with a 69-93 record and last place in the division, after two consecutive seasons above .500. However, within the collective debacle, there were several interesting stories that deserve attention. That’s why I propose looking back in three pieces, in which I’ll present my ranking of the team’s best hitters, pitchers, and fielders during the season. That said, let’s get to our Top 3, starting with the Royals’ hitters of the year in 2026. #3: Carter Jensen, C Season Stats: .239/.323/.467, 27 HR, 81 RBI, 10.8 BB%, 28.3 K%, .228 ISO, .294 BABIP, 116 wRC+, -0.5 BsR, 3.7 fWAR I liked it when the Royals started using him as their leadoff hitter, but what motivated me most to follow Jensen’s season amid the team’s struggles was the sensation he created with his ability to hit home runs. I confess that, following the Royals, I often gave up, but I was always paying attention to Jensen at a certain time. Yes, I usually did so during one of his first at-bats in each game. And, of course, I kept waiting for his next bomb to open the scoring for Kansas City. The Royals established a franchise record with nine leadoff home runs, tying for sixth in the major leagues. Jensen hit six of them, the most in a single season in club history and one fewer than Joc Pederson (7), the American League leader. Jensen’s power was a sensation. He finished the season among the American League rookie leaders: he led the league in doubles (35) and extra-base hits (64), ranked second in RBI (81), and third in home runs (27), slugging (.467), walks (65), and total bases (246). He also ranked fifth in OPS (.790). Now, what surprised me most was a combination that isn’t usually common among power hitters. Jensen finished in the 85th percentile in Barrel%, but combined that ability to generate hard-hit balls with an interesting approach at the plate: he ranked in the 84th percentile in Chase% and the 73rd in BB%. At 23 years old, that plate discipline and his proven power are two of the main factors that can continue driving Jensen’s growth as a hitter. With his 27 home runs in 149 games, he surpassed Bob Hamelin (24 HR in 1994) to establish the Royals’ rookie home run record. At the same time, his 64 extra-base hits surpassed the 61 recorded by Hall of Famer Mike Piazza during his 1993 Rookie of the Year season, establishing the Major League record for the most extra-base hits by a rookie catcher (minimum of 50% of games played at catcher). #2: Jac Caglianone, RF Season Stats: .289/.340/.494, 23 HR, 75 RBI, 6.0 BB%, 26.0 K%, .205 ISO, .361 BABIP, 129 wRC+, 1.1 BsR, 2.6 fWAR Since we’re talking about Jensen, let’s start by remembering that he joined Caglianone (23 HR) to form the fifth pair of left-handed teammates in Royals history—on the sixth occasion—to hit at least 20 home runs each in a season. But, in a sense, Caglianone’s story in 2026 was different. His season had its ups and downs: he produced a 74 wRC+ in May, climbed to 184 in June, and fell back to 62 in July. When the first half of the season ended, he was hitting .260/.321/.461, with a .201 ISO, an excellent .335 BABIP, and a 115 wRC+. If you followed Jac for much of that first half, you know he was doing things that aren’t common for someone who was only in the second year of his career. That’s why, heading into the second half, I admit I was a little skeptical. Maybe the same happened to you. I never doubted his talent, but as the season progressed and at-bats accumulated, it’s not so easy to maintain the pace or even surpass it. Caglianone did it. He crushed it on the mound in the second half of the season, and although the Royals weren’t going anywhere and perhaps many people thought he didn’t have as much pressure competing on a losing team, he showed he was ready to take the next step. He did it by becoming an even more aggressive hitter, something that also surprised. His walk rate dropped from 7.2% to 3.9% after the All-Star break, but he produced a monstrous offensive line of .337/.373/.549, with a .922 OPS and a 153 wRC+ in 204 plate appearances. His finish to the season was unstoppable. Caglianone hit .411 (39-for-95) with 26 RBI in August and became the third player in franchise history to record a batting average of at least .410 and 25 RBI in the same month (minimum of 90 at-bats). He joined Hall of Famer George Brett (.430, 30 RBI), in August 1980, and Amos Otis (.413, 29 RBI), in September 1978. He also reached base safely in each of his first 17 games in August, including a career-best 13-game hitting streak from August 1-15. During that period, he recorded a .463 OBP, with 10 extra-base hits and 20 RBI. But that’s not the only reason I believe Caglianone ranked ahead of Jensen. He was also a much more productive hitter, with a 129 wRC+, ran the bases better, and had at-bat quality surpassed only by Witt Jr. #1: Bobby Witt Jr., SS Season Stats: .281/.359/.441, 18 HR, 54 RBI, 10.6 BB%, 17.2 K%, .159 ISO, .320 BABIP, 119 wRC+, 9.3 BsR, 7.0 fWAR Bobby was somewhat below the superstar level he showed in the previous two seasons. His slugging percentage fell below his .500 standard, and he finished with the lowest numbers of his career in home runs (18), RBI (54), and ISO (.159). Even so, he made a difference with his ability to contribute offensively, stay on base —he finished with the best walk rate of his career (10.6%)— and stand out thanks to his skill at running the bases. Even below several of his usual standards, that combination led him to record 7.0 fWAR and remain among the game’s elite. There’s not much to discuss: Witt Jr. remains one of the most complete players in baseball. He finished second in the major leagues with 7.0 fWAR, trailing only the Cubs’ Pete Crow-Armstrong (10.6). In the American League, he finished among the 2026 leaders in stolen bases (second, 45), doubles (tied for sixth, 33), hits (ninth, 157), runs scored (ninth, 94), and batting average (tied for ninth, .281). As usual, he also stood out for his defensive excellence. He led the American League with +24 Outs Above Average and, since his debut in 2022, his +65 OAA places him tied for fourth in the major leagues among players at all positions. View full article

Image courtesy of William Purnell-Imagn Images Well, the Kansas City Royals’ season has come to an end, and the feeling the season left us with was not the best. The team fell out of the race too early, the injuries were devastating, and they were never prepared to recover. Since it is never too early to think about next season, I have been reflecting on some ideas that open different expectations about how the Royals could improve their pitching, especially to avoid the breakdowns of a bullpen that has been the worst in the league this year. Here are three thoughts to reflect on. Noah Cameron has shown that he will be key within the 2027 core If injuries had not hit him, the left-hander Cole Ragans was supposed to be the left-handed arm and ace of the Kansas City Royals’ rotation over these last two seasons. Ragans led the team with 9.5 fWAR between 2023 and 2025, but he has been able to make only 21 starts over the last two seasons. Instead, the Royals have had the contribution of Noah Cameron, who arrived in the league on April 30 of last year and, since then, has a 18-15 record, a 4.10 xERA, and has recorded 4.6 fWAR in 55 starts. The only Royals pitcher with more fWAR is Michael Wacha, who has accumulated 6.4 over that span. Last year, Cameron was a revelation, but his 2026 season has shown that he can already be considered part of the team’s main rotation core. And I still feel he can be much better. Last year, Cameron pitched to a 4.10 xFIP, and this year he has recorded 4.16. However, with such a similar profile, this year he had a 4.11 ERA, 1.12 runs above last year’s 2.99 ERA. Part of the difference has been in his ability to leave runners on base: his LOB% fell from 84% to 70.2%, while his BABIP rose from .241 to .276. Either way, Cameron’s fWAR has been better this year at 2.7, representing almost 59% of his career fWAR so far. Cameron has not stood out for finding dominance through the velocity of his fastball, and part of his biggest problems came after adding a sinker that did not give him results. Opponents have hit .424 against him this year, making it the only pitch in his entire repertoire that has been crushed. Even so, what catches my attention most about Cameron is his ability to move through the game and challenge hitters. His durability has been demonstrated throughout the year, recording at least five innings in 27 of his 31 starts. But where Cameron rises up, and I think it is the type of situation that defines him, is after facing the batting order for the second time. The second time through, he has allowed 13 of his 21 home runs, and opponents are slugging .543 in 270 plate appearances. But when he faces the order for the third time, the story changes and, often, Cameron has been able to make adjustments and finish off his opponents, reducing the slugging to .364 and recording his highest K-BB% rate at 19.2%. In any of the Royals’ future plans, his presence on the mound will be key, and once Ragans returns, the rotation could recover the power of the left-handed profile they have had in recent seasons. Daniel Lynch IV should return to reinforce the bullpen There isn't much to discuss here. Being honest, I never liked the move of Daniel Lynch IV to the starting rotation. The Royals were not competing for anything, and they did not have the urgency to do it for almost the entire second half of the season. In just nine starts, Lynch IV has recorded 74% of the innings he pitched in his first 46 appearances as a reliever this year, and his ERA has jumped from 1.96 to 7.01. If this was a test, I think it is clear that it has been enough. Without the contribution of Lynch IV, who recorded 0.8 fWAR as a reliever, the Royals’ bullpen combined for –1.5 fWAR, while his work as a starter has been the worst of the entire rotation at –0.3. The best conclusion the Royals have been able to draw from this is that, after Lynch IV’s departure, opportunities opened up for several pitchers in the bullpen, with some good performances from Connor Thomas, Anthony Gose, José Cuas and Nate Pearson, who have combined for 1.3 fWAR since August 4. If Carlos Estévez does not return, who closes? It would be sensible for the Royals not to risk having Carlos Estévez in their plans, after a season lost to physical problems and shoulder surgery that ended his chances of returning in 2026. The Royals have a $13 million option for 2027, but it is likely that they will end up declining it and paying the $2 million buyout. If so, they would leave room to fill a role that Estévez occupied during 2025, when he led MLB with 42 saves. We have talked a lot about how vulnerable the Royals’ relief pitching has been, but the biggest problems have not really been ineffectiveness in save opportunities. Kansas City ranks 10th in MLB in save percentage at 59%, falling from third place last year (70%) when Estévez was healthy. What has been a real problem is the 41% of inherited runners who have scored, the worst in the American League and behind only the St. Louis Cardinals (59%) in all of the Majors. So, the Royals need to find effective arms that can maintain control of leads so that the game can reach the decisive innings with more save opportunities. Now, as for who would be the next closer if Estévez does not continue with the team, the answer could be within the organization. The Royals have used Steven Cruz (eight saves), Nate Pearson (3) and Alex Lange (2) in the closer role during the second half of the season, a stretch in which the Royals had the worst bullpen in the league with –0.5 fWAR. If it is about talent, Cruz has all the potential to solve the ninth inning. This year, his fastball has been at its highest average velocity at 98.5 mph and, even so, eight of the 14 home runs he has allowed have come against his fastball. His Location+ has improved to 97, above his career mark of 93. Cruz has a cutter and a slider that continue to improve, so if he can make adjustments, he could become a key reliever for 2027, especially if the Royals end up giving him the opportunity to close. View full article

Image courtesy of Jay Biggerstaff-Imagn Images The Kansas City Royals’ offense, even with what they have, could have been better. It is clear that they need their main players to be healthy and to add power to the lineup. However, I have felt throughout the year that the Royals have been close to changing many games, but they have not been able to achieve enough consistency in key moments. So there are many things to discuss about the team’s main offensive breakdowns, but before that, I want to bring you this challenge. Below, I selected a Royals team from one of the last 15 seasons and compiled some interesting combined records for its players, such as the number of hitters with 15 or more home runs, 100 or more strikeouts, and 15 or more stolen bases. I will be comparing them with this 2026 team, so you will have to guess which team option A and B are. Year Lg W L Finish R/G R H 2B 3B HR SB CS BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS Rank 2026 AL Central 68 90 5 10 10 5 1 8 11 4 8 10 13 4 7 9 9 7.8 2015 AL Central 95 67 1 6 6 2 3 4 14 2 8 15 15 2 7 8 7 7.1 As you can see, Team A has a better average in these rankings that I chose, and if you still have doubts, yes, it is this year’s team. Now, what will probably surprise you is that Team B is the 2015 team that finished by winning the division and then the World Series against the New York Mets. Of course, these are only some combined offensive numbers, but they have not been that far apart in the impact both had within the league in their respective years. TEAM 1.0+ bWAR 15+ HR 20 HR+ 15+ SB 100+ H 50+ R 100+ K 10+ GDP Rank A 9 5 2 2 6 4 5 3 27 B 9 5 3 3 6 6 2 7 32 If there is one thing both teams have stood out in, it is their ability to make contact. The 2015 Royals were the second team in Contact% in 2015, and this year’s team appears in second place, behind the Tampa Bay Rays. So this 2026 version is not as far off as perhaps one might think and, as the rankings in each statistic show, the biggest difference has been in the ability to score runs. The 2015 team was sixth, and that small difference between 4.47 and 4.25 runs scored per game was enough to get better results with the complement of pitching and defense. That is why I still believe that, in a certain way, the Royals can be much better with what they have if they can focus better on run production and, above all, get their main hitters to lead the team in the situations that define games. Here is an important part of the assignments that remained unfinished for the Royals’ offense and became the biggest breakdowns throughout the season. Late & Close and Tie Game Player sOPS+ PA HR RBI BB SO BA OBP SLG OPS BAbip Nick Loftin 158 74 3 12 10 10 .270 .370 .540 .910 .280 Michael Massey 157 68 3 10 2 11 .354 .368 .538 .906 .385 Bobby Witt Jr. 142 97 3 14 16 20 .291 .412 .430 .843 .351 Salvador Perez 116 90 4 16 6 16 .253 .303 .458 .761 .270 Jac Caglianone 103 75 2 10 6 24 .261 .320 .391 .711 .372 John Rave 98 27 1 5 2 8 .240 .296 .400 .696 .313 Vinnie Pasquantino 97 73 3 13 3 17 .242 .260 .439 .700 .260 Lane Thomas 86 58 1 8 9 15 .213 .345 .298 .643 .281 Carter Jensen 84 91 4 13 11 32 .179 .286 .359 .645 .233 Kyle Isbel 51 61 1 5 0 20 .214 .228 .304 .532 .314 Isaac Collins 40 99 2 6 12 28 .136 .260 .222 .483 .173 Maikel Garcia 29 55 0 6 6 11 .167 .255 .188 .442 .211 Josh Rojas 23 15 0 3 0 4 .214 .214 .214 .429 .300 Starling Marte -23 31 0 0 2 6 .103 .161 .103 .265 .130 Tyler Tolbert -23 17 0 0 2 6 .071 .188 .071 .259 .125 These were two of the situations in which Kansas City let the most opportunities to change the story of games slip away. In Late & Close situations, the Royals have recorded the second-worst OBP in all of the Majors at .299, and the fourth-lowest OPS+ in the American League. In those situations at the end of games, on-base percentage is just as important as hitting a key hit, since it allows the team to keep pressuring the opponent and gets closer to the possibility of putting together a rally. The Royals did not accomplish it throughout the year, despite hitters who are somewhat undervalued, such as Nick Loftin and Michael Massey, leading the lineup with the highest adjusted OPS figures. Instead, key hitters such as Vinnie Pasquantino and Carter Jensen fell below expectations. If you look further down the table, Kyle Isbel and Isaac Collins appear with a combined OPS of 45. They were usually at the bottom of the lineup more regularly than other hitters, and they have been some of the easiest outs in the entire league in that situation. The low production in Late & Close also combines with the second-lowest on-base percentage in the Majors when the game is tied. Player sOPS+ BAbip PA HR RBI% Lane Thomas 162 .380 86 5 19.8% John Rave 103 .300 34 1 14.7% Salvador Perez 95 .288 165 5 14.5% Josh Rojas 93 .364 26 0 11.5% Michael Massey 85 .300 97 3 10.3% Bobby Witt Jr. 111 .298 199 7 10.1% Carter Jensen 82 .236 173 8 9.2% Vinnie Pasquantino 105 .287 136 3 8.8% Isaac Collins 94 .297 104 1 8.7% Nick Loftin 85 .243 104 2 8.7% Jac Caglianone 75 .267 135 4 7.4% Starling Marte 30 .286 32 0 6.3% Maikel Garcia 102 .305 107 2 4.7% Tyler Tolbert 153 .333 23 1 4.3% Kyle Isbel 40 .256 64 1 3.1% Matthew Lugo 14 .200 8 0 0.0% Jonathan India -5 .125 13 0 0.0% Andrew Velazquez -6 .200 6 0 0.0% Elias Díaz -100 .000 4 0 0.0% Luke Maile -100 .000 4 0 0.0% Kameron Misner -100 .000 4 0 0.0% In this situation, Lane Thomas was the most productive hitter before being traded at the trade deadline to the Atlanta Braves. Pasquantino’s drop in RBI% also stands out, as do Jensen and Jac Caglianone in OPS+, who are part of the power core Kansas City needs in decisive moments. Once again, Salvador Perez and Bobby Witt Jr. remain steady, Massey is close to average in OPS and has one of the best RBI%, while John Rave’s timely hitting is also surprising. The Lost Value of Taking an Extra Base If we had to evaluate the Royals’ baserunning by their +5 Baserunning Runs, with +1 through extra bases taken and +4 through stolen bases, then we would come to the conclusion that they have been able to take advantage often in baserunning after a defensive lapse. However, the story here goes beyond that and reflects two different points: Kansas City has had success stealing bases, but not trying to take extra bases when the ball is put in play, which are two very different situations. In that regard, the Royals have let many opportunities to score runs slip away this year, despite accumulating 634 total advancement attempts, the highest figure in MLB. They have not been able to take advantage of those big opportunities with inefficient decisions. The team has recorded -15 runs from runners being thrown out while trying to advance and another -15 from opportunities in which they did not advance when they could have, two of the most negative figures in the Major Leagues in those categories. By not being able to take extra bases, a large number of opportunities to produce runs are lost throughout games, even with the possibility of taking advantage of outs that could have been productive. Each of these points was especially key in the 47 losses the Royals have suffered this year by two or fewer runs, including the three shutouts they have suffered. There have been an incredible number of games that slipped away at the end, with the 10 walk-off losses standing out so far, seven of them in the first half of the season, and the same number in the ninth inning. Kansas City has averaged 4.25 runs per game, but the slim gap between 4.25 and 5.00 has made a notable difference in their results, as the team has a 45-18 record when they score at least five runs. Heading into 2027, it is clear that the Royals need to rethink many aspects, but one of the most important will be working to get more quality at-bats when every situation that can change the game arises. View full article

Image courtesy of John E. Sokolowski-Imagn Images There is an interesting difference that seems to divide Nick Loftin’s profile into two types of hitter: the positive one, when he comes to the plate with runners in scoring position, and the negative one, when he has the challenge of getting on base with the bases empty. Loftin, who is having the best offensive season of his career, has posted a 117 wRC+ with RISP and 78 when there are no runners on base. However, and this is what we will explore further, he has created that difference with almost the same walk rate, only 3.4% fewer strikeouts, an ISO of .135 (RISP) and .133 (Empty). The only notable differences have been in OPS (.782 vs. .637) and wRC+. Now, across the league during that same span, there are only 10 hitters with a larger differential than Loftin’s 39 wRC+ gap who have posted a 78 wRC+ or lower with the bases empty since 2025. Let’s now focus on the environment where Loftin plays to look at other Royals hitters. Player EMPTY wRC+ RISP wRC+ Dif. EMPTY wOBA RISP wOBA Dif. EMPTY ISO RISP ISO Dif. Nick Loftin 78 117 39 .285 .342 .057 .133 .135 .002 Salvador Perez 72 99 27 .276 .315 .039 .176 .170 -.006 Bobby Witt Jr. 130 137 7 .360 .370 .010 .189 .206 .017 Jac Caglianone 95 91 -4 .309 .304 -.005 .182 .171 -.011 Kyle Isbel 83 76 -7 .293 .283 -.010 .120 .054 -.066 Carter Jensen 107 95 -12 .328 .310 -.018 .236 .119 -.117 Vinnie Pasquantino 109 90 -19 .330 .303 -.027 .193 .182 -.011 Maikel Garcia 133 108 -25 .365 .329 -.036 .175 .102 -.073 Michael Massey 94 45 -49 .308 .238 -.070 .127 .096 -.031 Among the Royals, there has been no hitter with at least a 100 wRC+ who has been more effective with RISP compared to his wRC+ with the bases empty. Salvador Pérez’s profile comes closest, and it is notable that, as has also happened with Loftin, his ISO in both situations has been similar, as has his wOBA. Bobby Witt Jr.’s stability shows what the elite standard between both situations should be. Jac Caglianone, Kyle Isbel and Carter Jensen have been fairly even in both situations, while it is surprising to see Michael Massey with the biggest drop on the team. This completes Loftin’s entire profile in both situations, year by year. Season Situational BB% K% AVG OBP SLG OPS ISO BABIP wRC+ 2023 Men In Scoring 13.3% 6.7% .455 .533 .545 1.079 .091 .455 196 2023 Bases Empty 5.1% 20.5% .189 .231 .216 .447 .027 .241 19 2024 Men In Scoring 13.5% 13.5% .200 .297 .200 .497 .000 .222 47 2024 Bases Empty 12.6% 16.5% .146 .262 .180 .442 .034 .181 33 2025 Men In Scoring 13.2% 10.5% .300 .395 .433 .828 .133 .321 128 2025 Bases Empty 4.4% 15.9% .176 .212 .306 .518 .130 .184 37 2026 Men In Scoring 9.6% 15.4% .259 .343 .388 .731 .129 .282 104 2026 Bases Empty 11.3% 17.3% .232 .325 .365 .689 .133 .275 95 Total Men In Scoring 11.3% 13.4% .269 .359 .372 .731 .103 .292 105 Total Bases Empty 9.5% 17.1% .197 .278 .300 .578 .103 .230 62 In each of his four MLB seasons, Loftin has been a much more productive hitter with RISP. The difference, as we saw earlier, has been mostly in his ability to make contact and produce, with a higher BABIP (.292) and a major improvement in wRC+ (105 vs. 62). Now, the inevitable question here is how Loftin has managed to be a more consistent hitter in RISP situations, where the pressure is supposed to increase. The chart offers an interesting clue. Loftin expands his attack zone with RISP: the percentage of his swings inside the zone drops from 88% to 78%, while he nearly doubles his chase of pitches outside the zone, rising from 12% to 22%. And that is where the difference that explains a good part of his production appears, as his batting average goes from .214 with the bases empty to .279 with RISP, dominating the middle and inner part of the strike zone. This is a very curious case and, often, examples like this make me think about the many times I have seen a hitter succeed when he is sure of what he wants to look for at the plate and how he protects his comfort zone. We can see many results in the statistics, but only by watching the game and every body expression from hitters can we often understand what he was looking for, what pitch really took him out of his approach and what was a bad decision. I have never thought that missing a pitch is a bad decision when the hitter is trying his best swing, even if he ends up missing by several inches. The more serious decision problem comes with those pitches the hitter decided to attack at the last moment and that clearly left him without an answer. Loftin, in general, has proven to himself that his approach with RISP is much better than in at-bats with the bases empty where he usually sees more pitches and is less aggressive. So far, his track record shows that over the last two seasons, that philosophy has not given him results. Instead, when producing matters most, he has been one of the Royals’ most consistent hitters. Sometimes that’s simply how it happens: we should never look only at what a hitter’s or pitcher’s overall numbers show us. In Loftin’s case, I think there is something more interesting than his career numbers: understanding why his best version appears when he has runners in scoring position. And perhaps the answer lies in something as simple as knowing what he wants to look for at the plate and sticking with that decision until the end. View full article