This Is A Bullpen Without a Finishing Pitch

[Yirsandy Rodríguez]

Image courtesy of Vincent Carchietta-Imagn Images

Two strikes should put the hitter on the defensive, but against the Kansas City bullpen, the exact opposite happens. The issue isn't getting ahead; it's finding the pitch to finish the plate appearance. A drop in secondary pitch effectiveness has completely eliminated the uncertainty in the batter's box. Without a breaking or offspeed offering that threatens the zone, hitters get comfortable, extend at-bats, and drive the ball hard—wiping out late-inning leads in the process.

The numbers don't lie about the collapse: the Royals bullpen sits at the bottom of Major League Baseball with a disastrous -3.5 WAR and the lowest xERA (4.93) in the American League. They surrender 1.49 home runs per nine innings—the highest rate in MLB—while opponents punish them with a 40.4% hard-hit rate. This isn't a temporary slump limited to a couple of arms; it's a structural flaw in how the unit attempts to close out games.

A year ago, a breaking pitch below the zone forced hitters to make split-second decisions. Today, they lay off with ease because they know the next pitch will have to come over the plate.

Lucas Erceg's case illustrates it perfectly. Armed with a fastball that averages 97.2 mph, Erceg should freeze hitters when he's ahead in the count. Instead, his changeup has turned into a non-threat, yielding an astronomical 1.000 slugging percentage without generating a single strikeout. That means that, in that situation, the hitter can forget about emergency contact and most of the time look to do maximum damage against the changeup.

That ineffective changeup disrupted his entire sequence. With one fewer variable to worry about, opposing batters no longer need to cover the bottom edge and can gear up early for the heater. The result is a damning .387 wOBA on Erceg's two-strike fastball. The velocity is still there. The deception is gone.

John Schreiber, the most trusted and heavily used arm in the corps, reflects the very same issue. On paper, his 3.64 ERA (which drops to a microscopic 1.11 at home) masks the underlying damage. But when Schreiber gets ahead in the count and goes for his put-away pitch outside the zone, he loses command of the edges. The result has been so alarming that hitters have raised their meatball swing percentage to 83%, the highest mark of any season in his career with at least 700 pitches.

Matt Strahm tells a similar tale. His slider lost its bite on the corners, allowing hitters to spit on it and sit dead-red on a fastball he is forced to throw for strikes—a pitch they are crushing to a .526 slugging percentage.

Nick Mears represents the most extreme case. Every single home run he has surrendered would have left all 30 ballparks. Alex Lange and Eli Morgan exhibit the same trend, albeit on a smaller scale. Home runs aren't the problem. They are the visible consequence of everything that happened before. To save the final third of the game, Kansas City has had to turn to arms capable of dictating the pace of the matchup again through the quality of their secondary offerings.

Enter Daniel Lynch IV and Steven Cruz, two relievers who regained control of plate appearances in different ways. While others try to impose themselves with the fastball, Lynch forces hitters to account for more than one possibility. Riding a sinker that holds opponents to a .140 average and a slider generating a 44.1% whiff rate, Lynch doesn't need dazzling velocity to survive because he keeps hitters off balance. In his game plan, that uncertainty has been worth more this year than a couple of extra miles per hour.

Cruz, for his part, regained control by adding a cutter that forced opponents to account for two different speeds. Holding opponents to a .149 average with that pitch, his 98.6 mph fastball is making an impact again: hitters have to think twice before starting their swing.

That is the flaw exposing this bullpen. Surrendering 1.53 home runs per nine innings alongside a 40.6% hard-hit rate is the consequence of running out of put-away pitches. The moment a hitter realizes the secondary pitch is no longer a threat, the at-bat no longer belongs to the pitcher.

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[Lopsided]

And now that they have basically two arms in the bullpen, they are making one of them a starter.  DLIV has never been very good at starting games.  I would imagine we will get to see his ERA rise into the upper 3s in less than 4 starts.  Since the Royals already know that the bullpen arms are just "rags", they might as well bring up some more of their young arms to give them a chance.  I'm not saying bring up a Single A Arm up, but there are a couple arms in AA that are pitching, Chase Jessee is not an arm they will be able to count on in the future as he walks hitters at an almost 1 per inning rate but he does get some swings and misses.  They could give him a shot and see how badly he can be. What if they found a way to help him gain some control, he might be able to only give up one run per two innings, it would be a start. At 27 he isn't going anywhere probably anyway.