The Contradiction Of Nick Loftin

[Yirsandy Rodríguez]

Image courtesy of John E. Sokolowski-Imagn Images

There is an interesting difference that seems to divide Nick Loftin’s profile into two types of hitter: the positive one, when he comes to the plate with runners in scoring position, and the negative one, when he has the challenge of getting on base with the bases empty. Loftin, who is having the best offensive season of his career, has posted a 117 wRC+ with RISP and 78 when there are no runners on base. However, and this is what we will explore further, he has created that difference with almost the same walk rate, only 3.4% fewer strikeouts, an ISO of .135 (RISP) and .133 (Empty). The only notable differences have been in OPS (.782 vs. .637) and wRC+.

Now, across the league during that same span, there are only 10 hitters with a larger differential than Loftin’s 39 wRC+ gap who have posted a 78 wRC+ or lower with the bases empty since 2025. Let’s now focus on the environment where Loftin plays to look at other Royals hitters.

Player	EMPTY wRC+	RISP wRC+	Dif.	EMPTY wOBA	RISP wOBA	Dif.	EMPTY ISO	RISP ISO	Dif.
Nick Loftin	78	117	39	.285	.342	.057	.133	.135	.002
Salvador Perez	72	99	27	.276	.315	.039	.176	.170	-.006
Bobby Witt Jr.	130	137	7	.360	.370	.010	.189	.206	.017
Jac Caglianone	95	91	-4	.309	.304	-.005	.182	.171	-.011
Kyle Isbel	83	76	-7	.293	.283	-.010	.120	.054	-.066
Carter Jensen	107	95	-12	.328	.310	-.018	.236	.119	-.117
Vinnie Pasquantino	109	90	-19	.330	.303	-.027	.193	.182	-.011
Maikel Garcia	133	108	-25	.365	.329	-.036	.175	.102	-.073
Michael Massey	94	45	-49	.308	.238	-.070	.127	.096	-.031

Among the Royals, there has been no hitter with at least a 100 wRC+ who has been more effective with RISP compared to his wRC+ with the bases empty. Salvador Pérez’s profile comes closest, and it is notable that, as has also happened with Loftin, his ISO in both situations has been similar, as has his wOBA. Bobby Witt Jr.’s stability shows what the elite standard between both situations should be. Jac Caglianone, Kyle Isbel and Carter Jensen have been fairly even in both situations, while it is surprising to see Michael Massey with the biggest drop on the team. This completes Loftin’s entire profile in both situations, year by year.

Season	Situational	BB%	K%	AVG	OBP	SLG	OPS	ISO	BABIP	wRC+
2023	Men In Scoring	13.3%	6.7%	.455	.533	.545	1.079	.091	.455	196
2023	Bases Empty	5.1%	20.5%	.189	.231	.216	.447	.027	.241	19
2024	Men In Scoring	13.5%	13.5%	.200	.297	.200	.497	.000	.222	47
2024	Bases Empty	12.6%	16.5%	.146	.262	.180	.442	.034	.181	33
2025	Men In Scoring	13.2%	10.5%	.300	.395	.433	.828	.133	.321	128
2025	Bases Empty	4.4%	15.9%	.176	.212	.306	.518	.130	.184	37
2026	Men In Scoring	9.6%	15.4%	.259	.343	.388	.731	.129	.282	104
2026	Bases Empty	11.3%	17.3%	.232	.325	.365	.689	.133	.275	95
Total	Men In Scoring	11.3%	13.4%	.269	.359	.372	.731	.103	.292	105
Total	Bases Empty	9.5%	17.1%	.197	.278	.300	.578	.103	.230	62

In each of his four MLB seasons, Loftin has been a much more productive hitter with RISP. The difference, as we saw earlier, has been mostly in his ability to make contact and produce, with a higher BABIP (.292) and a major improvement in wRC+ (105 vs. 62). Now, the inevitable question here is how Loftin has managed to be a more consistent hitter in RISP situations, where the pressure is supposed to increase.

The chart offers an interesting clue. Loftin expands his attack zone with RISP: the percentage of his swings inside the zone drops from 88% to 78%, while he nearly doubles his chase of pitches outside the zone, rising from 12% to 22%. And that is where the difference that explains a good part of his production appears, as his batting average goes from .214 with the bases empty to .279 with RISP, dominating the middle and inner part of the strike zone.

This is a very curious case and, often, examples like this make me think about the many times I have seen a hitter succeed when he is sure of what he wants to look for at the plate and how he protects his comfort zone. We can see many results in the statistics, but only by watching the game and every body expression from hitters can we often understand what he was looking for, what pitch really took him out of his approach and what was a bad decision. I have never thought that missing a pitch is a bad decision when the hitter is trying his best swing, even if he ends up missing by several inches. The more serious decision problem comes with those pitches the hitter decided to attack at the last moment and that clearly left him without an answer.

Loftin, in general, has proven to himself that his approach with RISP is much better than in at-bats with the bases empty where he usually sees more pitches and is less aggressive. So far, his track record shows that over the last two seasons, that philosophy has not given him results. Instead, when producing matters most, he has been one of the Royals’ most consistent hitters.

Sometimes that’s simply how it happens: we should never look only at what a hitter’s or pitcher’s overall numbers show us. In Loftin’s case, I think there is something more interesting than his career numbers: understanding why his best version appears when he has runners in scoring position. And perhaps the answer lies in something as simple as knowing what he wants to look for at the plate and sticking with that decision until the end.

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